Michigan Law Review
Volume 85

Issue 7

1987

The Excessive History of Federal Rule 15(c) and its Lessons for
Civil Rules Revision
Harold S. Lewis Jr.
Mercer University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons

Recommended Citation
Harold S. Lewis Jr., The Excessive History of Federal Rule 15(c) and its Lessons for Civil Rules Revision,
85 MICH. L. REV. 1507 (1987).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol85/iss7/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

THE EXCESSIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL
RULE 15(c) AND ITS LESSONS FOR CIVIL
RULES REVISIONt
Harold S. Lewis, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION

What role remains for traditional doctrinal analysis? Bounded on
one side by the nee-nihilism of critical legal studies, and on the other
by the unabashedly "cold-blooded" 1 latter-day Darwinism of law and
economics, can traditional analysts still make a valuable contribution?
In the midst of these curve-ball throwing southpaws and hard-throwing right-handers, can today's leftover Langdellians2 serve out their
years with dignity as respected utility players?
This case study of one Federal Rule of Civil Procedure is designed
to suggest affirmative answers to these questions. My focus is on the
surprisingly extensive body of case law, culminating in the Supreme
Court's 1986 decision in Schiavone v. Fortune, 3 that parses the second
sentence of Federal Rule 15(c).4 Added in 1966, that sentence at-
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1. R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 171 (1985).
2. Judge Posner equates traditional doctrinal analysis with the "nineteenth-century formalist
thinking of Dean Langdell." Id. at 324.
3. 106 s. Ct. 2379 (1986).
4. FED. R. Ctv. P. 15(c). The Rule states:
(c) Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of
the original pleading. An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted
relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period provided by law for
commencing the action against him, the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake
concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against
him.
The delivery or mailing of process to the United States Attorney, or his designee, or the
Attorney General of the United States, or an agency or officer who would have been a
proper defendant if named, satisfies the requirement of clauses (1) and (2) hereof with re-
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tempts to set standards for the rel~tion back of party-changing amendments to pleadings. A more prototypically pedestrian, less
prepossessing topic of the traditionalist type could scarcely be
imagined. Yet a review of its history brings larger points into sharp
relief: something is seriously amiss in our Federal Rules amending
process, and the costs of stasis are high.
More particularly, I hope to show that the management or mismanagement of the Federal Rules promulgation and amendment process has significant caseload implications; that the cumbersome
complex of the Supreme Court and the Judicial Conference of the
United States has failed to stay abreast of litigation developments that
warrant consideration of Rules amendments; that the Court could improve the process marginally by serving as a better sentinel, systematically identifying needed changes in the Rules; but finally, that the
Court, even with its extensive drafting support team, needs assistance
in its role as principal promulgator of Federal Rules amendments.
These ideas are not new. A decade ago acute judicial5 and academic6 observers cited important institutional and practical objections
to a rulemaking scheme which, then as now, was left to the initiative
and discretion of the Supreme Court. Yet it is a timeworn office of
traditional doctrinal scholarship to iterate,7 to survey the results of
developments in the most recent reporting period and remind the
bench, the bar, and the legislature (if it is listening) that accumulated
experience has confirmed previously noted imperfections in our law or
procedures.
Twenty checkered years of experience with the 1966 amendment
to Federal Rule 15(c) vividly highlight the flabbiness of the Supreme
Court's oversight of the Federal Rules. A review of that history gives
fresh bite to the long-standing criticisms of the rules-revision process.
It suggests that there are some issues, properly the subject of federal
civil rulemaking, on which after a point repetitive litigation sheds insufficient light to justify its costs. On these issues, additional rulemaking would be far more efficient and no less fair. The same history also
suggests that the current institutional rulemaking machinery is plainly
spect to the United States or any agency or officer thereof to be brought into the action as a
defendant.
5. Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 16 CoLUM. L. REV. 905,

933-38 (1976).
6. Lesnick, The Federal Rule-Making Process: A Time/or Re-examination, 61 A.B.A. J. 579
(1975).
7. Even Judge Posner, perhaps the best-known exponent of applying economic analysis to
substantive and institutional legal issues, opines that there is seldom a discovery of anything new
in legal scholarship, as opposed to scholarship in the social sciences. R. POSNER, supra note I, at

327-28.
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inadequate to the task of initiating needed proposals for the study of
particular rules. While the most obvious answer - direct legislative
intervention in the rulemaking process - is probably not the best one,
it is ultimately the responsibility of Congress to reassess the entire process and remedy its deficiencies.
Part I briefly surveys the respective areas of responsibility for federal civil rulemaking that the Court and the Congress have exercised
since the Rules' adoption in 1938. Part II is an extended review, in five
sections, of the history of rule 15(c) before and, most tellingly, after its
amendment in 1966. Part III, returning to the roles of the Court and
the Congress, considers the lessons of the history of rule 15(c) for the
rules-revision process.

l.

FEDERAL CIVIL RULEMAKING: CONGRESS FINALLY STICKS A
FOOT IN THE DOOR OF !TS OWN HOUSE

It is no longer seriously questioned that the ultimate authority to
establish federal civil procedural rules resides in Congress. 8 True to
this conception, it is a statute, the Rules Enabling Act of 1934,9 which
authorizes the Supreme Court to promulgate general civil rules, reserving to Congress the final authority to alter or veto rules the Court
proposes. Shortly after Congress approved the Supreme Court's comprehensive blueprint of federal civil rules in 1938, the Court paid reciprocal homage to the Congress. It acknowledged Congress'
"undoubted power to regulate the practice and procedure of the federal courts" and to "exercise that power by delegating to this or other
federal courts authority to make rules not inconsistent with the statutes or constitution of the United States." 10
The federal civil rulemaking function has since "been delegated almost entirely to the courts; Congress' power over the area has been
reduced to a monitoring status." 11 Subsequent legislation has further
cemented the Supreme Court's preeminent position. For example,
Congress has commanded the Judicial Conference of the United States
to "carry on a continuous study of the operation and effect of the general rules of practice and procedure now or hereafter in use as prescribed by the Supreme Court." 12 The Conference is then directed to
submit its recommendations for rules changes or additions "to the
8. Weinstein, supra note 5, at 905 & n.2, 906, 927, 929; see Wright, Procedural Reform: Its
Limitations and Its Future, 1 GA. L. REv. 563, 565, 569-70 (1967).
9. 28 u.s.c. § 2072 (1982).
10. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941).
11. Weinstein, supra note 5, at 927.
12. 28 u.s.c. § 331 (1982).
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Supreme Court for its consideration and adoption, modification or rejection in accordance with law." 13 Moreover, the Chief Justice substantially influences the rules-amending process by determining
membership on the key Judicial Conference committees that are
charged with rulemaking responsibility. He appoints the members of
the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, which prepares the initial
draft of proposed rules changes, as well as the members of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, which reviews and
approves the Advisory Committee's draft before forwarding it to the
Conference as a whole. Fj.nal proposals acceptable to the entire Judicial Conference are then presented to the Court for its approval and
submission to Congress, as the Rules Enabling Act prescribes. 14
Equally significant is the passive role of Congress once the Court
signs off on proposed rules amendments. Under the Rules Enabling
Act, proposed amendments reported to Congress by the Chief Justice
no later than May 1 of a regular session of Congress will, "ninety days
after they have been thus reported," take effect automatically. 15 And,
until recently, that is what invariably happened. In 1982, however,
Congress finally balked at a Supreme Court proposal for a Federal
Rules amendment. It first delayed the proposed effective date 16 and
then altogether scotched 17 proposed amendments to Federal Rule 4
which the Chief Justice had transmitted to the Congress earlier that
year. 18 This reassertion of congressional authority, without precedent
in the arena of federal procedural rulemaking since the Rules Enabling
Act was adopted in 1934, 19 came in response to "numerous complaints" received by the House Committee on the Judiciary about a
Supreme Court proposal to make service by mail the primary method
of service of process. 20 In the end Congress amended Federal Rule 4
directly, substituting its own scheme of mail service for that proposed
13. 28 u.s.c. § 331 (1982).
14. For a description of the rules-amending and -approval process, see generally Weinstein,
supra note 5, at 908-09; Clark, The Role ofthe Supreme Court in Federal Rule-Making, 46 J. AM.
JUDICATURE SocY., 250, 253 (1963); Wright, supra note 8, at 565-66; Lesnick, supra note 6, at
581.
15. 28 u.s.c. § 2072 (1982).
16. Act of Aug. 2, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-227, 96 Stat. 246.
17. Act of Jan. 12, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-462, § 5, 96 Stat. 2527, 2530.
18. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2071 note (West Supp. 1987) (amendments proposed Apr. 20, 1982).
19. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27
STAN. L. REV. 673, 675 & n.18 (1975). In a parallel development a decade before, Congress did
object to the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, forbidding such rules from becoming effective
without further authorizing legislation. Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9. See
text at note 283 infra.
20. See H.R. REP. No. 7154, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1982 U.S. CooE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4437, 4439.
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by the Court. 21
Neither the Senate nor the House submitted a report accompanying this legislation, and perhaps for that reason Congress' intervention
in the rulemaking process has attracted little attention. This congressional action is potentially quite significant, however, for it underscores deficiencies in the current process and signals a potential
decentralization of the rulemaking initiative if those deficiencies stand
uncorrected.
On only this one occasion has Congress modified a Supreme
Court-proposed federal civil procedural rules change or proposed such
changes of its own. Whether Congress should itself amend Federal
Rules more often, beef-up or alter the existing Judicial Conference apparatus, delegate the chore to an administrative or independent
agency, or maintain the status quo raises complex questions of legitimacy, conflict of interest, and institutional efficiency. But one thing
seems certain: Federal Rules oversight under the current regime has·
sometimes been sadly lacking. The history of judicial efforts to put
flesh on the skeleton of Federal Rule 15(c) is a notable example.
II.
A.

THE AGONIZING HISTORY OF FEDERAL RULE

15(c)

The Principle of Relation Back and Federal Rule 15(c)

Relation-back rules breathe new life into lawsuits in which the person or entity the plaintiff intends to sue, the "intended defendant," has
not received personal or precise notice of an action's commencement
until after the last day of an applicable period of limitations. 22 Without relation back, amendments changing or adding parties after expiration of a statutory period violate a statute of limitations and one or
more of its underlying policies.23
There is substantial agreement about the nature of those policies.
Foremost is protecting a defendant from claims brought after "memories have faded, witnesses have died or disappeared, and evidence has
been lost." 24 Subsidiary policies have been termed as: alleviating a potential defendant's economic or psychological insecurity, often styled a
"policy of repose"; relieving courts of the burden of trying stale
21. Act of Jan. 12, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-462, § 5, 96 Stat. 2527, 2530.
22. See, e.g., Williams v. Pennsylvania R.R., 91 F. Supp. 652, 655 (D. Del. 1950):
[T]he statute of limitations seems the only reason for the motion [to amend and relate back]
and for the opposition to it. Without any question of the statute of limitations there could be
little objection to the amendment and, indeed, if no statute of limitations presented complications, it seems probable that a new suit would obviate any amendment or desire for it.
23. Note, Amendments That Add Plaintiffs Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure J5(c), 50
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 671, 672 (1982).
24. Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945).
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claims; penalizing plaintiffs who negligently or intentionally delay the
filing of their claims; easing the judicial system's caseload by eliminating old claims; and avoiding the disruptive effect that aged, unsettled
claims may have on commercial intercourse.25 There is also a widespread consensus that the period specified in any limitations statute is
essentially arbitrary; this arbitrariness is sometimes said to follow from
the fact that the statute is a creature of legislation rather than
adjudication. 26
Arrayed against these policies are several others which support
rules allowing relation back. Both the majority and dissent in Schiavone recognized that the principle of relation back is consonant with
the Rules' general goal of promoting decisions on the merits. The Justices understood that this goal could be frustrated by "mere technicalities."27 Justice Stevens, writing for the dissenters, described rule 15(c)
as having the principal purpose of "enabl[ing] a plaintiff to correct a
pleading error after the statute of limitations has run if the correction
will not prejudice his adversary in any way." 28 Rule 15(c) seeks to
effect a compromise between the conflicting policies of statutes of limitations and modem procedural rqles. 29 Its multiple timely notice requirements reflect the drafters' deference to the important goals of
statutes of limitations, 30 yet its main thrust is to identify circumstances
that justify relaxation of limitations strictures when necessary to facilitate decisions on the merits.
It is scarcely controversial to hold, with Professors James and
Hazard, that when a party-changing amendment is made after a limitations period expires, the relation-back problem should "be solved in
terms of the basic policies served by the statute imposing the limitation. "31 In the same breath, though, these commentators observe that
"[t]he cases are in hopeless confl.ict." 32 A look at the decisions before
the 1966 amendment discloses the dimensions of the quagmire.
25. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 218-19 (3d ed. 1985); Note, supra note
23, at 672 & nn.7-8; Note, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c): Relation Back ofAmendmellts,
57 MINN. L. REV. 83, 84-85 (1972) [hereinafter Note, Federal Rule].
26. See Note, Federal Rule, supra note 25, at 85 n.8, cited with approval in Schiavone v.
Fortune, 106 S. Ct. 2379, 2385 (1986); Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 1015, 1157 n.608 (1982).
27. 106 S. Ct. at 2383 (majority opinion) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181
(1962)); 106 S. Ct. at 2389 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (same); see also Note, Federal Rule, supra
note 25, at 87.
28. 106 S. Ct. at 2389.
29. See Note, supra note 23, at 672.
30. See Note, Federal Rule, supra note 25, at 87.
31. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 25, at 220.
32. Id. at 220 n.9.
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The Original Rule 15(c)

Before the Federal Rules were adopted in 1938, an amendment of
any kind was denied relation-back effect if a district judge viewed it as
stating a "new cause of action." Only if the amendment were considered a restatement in different form of the originally pleaded cause of
action would relation back be permitted and the bar of limitations thus
removed. Predictably, this standard generated a great deal of definitional litigation involving the concept of "cause of action." 33
The original rule 15(c) promulgated in 1938 substituted for the
"cause of action" standard a different question: Whether the new matter asserted by amendment arose from the "conduct, transaction, or
occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading. "34 While at the time of its adoption it was clearly understood that
relation back is for the most part of critical importance only when a
complaint is amended after a limitations period has run, 35 the original
rule did not refer at all to the applicable period of limitations or identify what act - filing, service, or something else - was critical to
timely commencement. Nor did it distinguish amendments that substantively alter a claim for relief without changing the denomination of
the defendant from those that substitute a new defendant or merely
correct the spelling or description of the original defendant.
The "arising out of" approach did permit courts to measure the
allegations of the amended pleading against the relatively concrete datum of operative facts, instead of the largely conceptual notion of
"cause of action." Under this regime, most courts allowed the relation
back of such amendments on the same terms as any other amendment
permitted by rule 15(c), that is, whenever the claim asserted in the
amended pleading arose out of the transaction set forth in the original
pleading. Amendments changing the capacity, name, or identity of
defendants were generally permitted so long as the court judged that
the intended defendant had received fair notice of the pendency of the
action through service of the original, defective complaint. Prior to the
1966 amendment, courts inclined to permit relation back would characterize most such mistakes in the original pleading as mere "misno33. See Note, Federal Rule, supra note 25, at 85-86; Haworth, Changing Defendants in Private Civil Actions Under Federal Rule 15(c) - An Ancient Problem Lingers On, 1975 Wis. L.
REV. 552, 554.
34. As originally enacted, rule 15(c), entitled "Relation Back of Amendments," read in its
entirety: "Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading,
the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c), 308 U.S.
683 (1939).
35. See note 22 supra.
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mers."36 So long as the original complaint was timely filed, service of
an amended summons and complaint correcting such "misnomers"
was held not to prejudice a defendant - even where the original, defective service was not made, and hence notice not received, until after
the limitations period had expired. 37
Indeed, even when a particular amendment was deemed to substitute or add a "new" defendant, federal judges created several equitable
exceptions to salvage apparently untimely actions. Chief among these
was the "identity-of-interest" doctrine. This imputed to the intended
defendant the notice of litigation that had been directed only to the
original, unintended defendant, if the commercial or other relationship
between the two was such that notice to one should reasonably be
viewed as notice to the other. 38 Some courts demurred, however,
choosing to regard rule 15(c) as simply a restatement of the law that
had been developed before the Federal Rules. 39 These judges were understandably concerned that a largely unrestrained "transaction or occurrence" approach pays insufficient attention to the timeliness of
notice received by the intended defendant and thus carries the potential for serious damage to limitations policies.
C.

The First Decade of the 1966 Amendment to Rule 15(c): To
What Cases Do Its New Standards Apply?

It seemed like a good idea at the time. Near the end of the first
quarter century of Federal Rule 15(c), a number of decisions involving
federal government defendants applied the rule quite restrictively. 40
The Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules, responding most immediately to these decisions, proposed an amendment to the rule which
sought to state the requirements of relation back with specificity. But
the amended rule was flawed at birth, abused during adolescence, and
has now been mauled at maturity. Since the 1966 amendment, a bewildering variety of interpretive problems have vexed the federal
courts in their attempt to fix the proper scope for relation back.
The rule that emerged from the Committee's proposal left the for36. See, e.g., cases cited in Haworth, supra note 33, at 560.61; see generally Note, Federal
Rule, supra note 25, at 89·90 & n.29, 112.
37. See Haworth, supra note 33, at 562 (discussing Jackson v. Duke, 259 F.2d 3 (5th Cir.
1958) (misnomer), and Grandey v. Pacific Indem. Co., 217 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1954) (misnomer
and misdescription)).
38. See Note, Federal Rule, supra note 25, at 91-92.
39. Id. at 89-90.
40. See cases cited infra note 46; Lemmon v. Social Sec. Admin., 20 F.R.D. 215 (E.D.S.C.
1957); Florentine v. Landon, 114 F. Supp. 452 (S.D. Cal. 1953), modified, 231F.2d452 (9th Cir.
1955) (cited in Byse, Suing the "Wrong" Defendant in Judicial Review of Federal Administrative
Action: Proposals far Reform, 77 HARV. L. REV. 40, 45 n.15 (1963)).
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mer rule41 intact as the first sentence of an expanded whole. In its
entirety the new rule reads as follows:
(c) Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or
occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading,
the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. An
amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates
back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period provided
by law for commencing the action against him, the party to be brought in
by amendment (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action
that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits,
and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the
identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against
him.
The delivery or mailing of process to the United States Attorney, or
his designee, or the Attorney General of the United States, or an agency
or officer who would have been a proper defendant if named, satisfies the
requirement of clauses (1) and (2) hereof with respect to the United
States or any agency or officer thereof to be brought into the action as a
defendant.42

The threshold problem concerns the types of alterations in an original pleading to which the additional requirements of the new second
sentence will apply. An amendment changing only the factual or legal
allegations asserted in the original pleading will be permitted upon a
simple showing that the "claim ... asserted in the amended pleading
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading." This is the sole requirement of rule 15(c)'s first sentence, the surviving part of the
original rule.
By contrast, amendments "changing the party against whom a
claim is asserted" are subject to the elaborated notice requirements of
the second sentence, added in 1966. As a result, courts continue to be
plagued under the 1966 amendment with the question of which
amendments truly change parties defendant. For example, is there a
change of party when the amendment merely corrects a misspelling or
misdescription of the party originally named? Should it make a difference if there exists a person or entity, other than the intended defendant, to which the misspelled or misdescribed name pertains?
The Advisory Committee's note accompanying the 1966 amendment parenthetically indicates that the party-changing amendments it
had in mind in the second sentence include those which merely "cor41. See note 34 supra.
42. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) (emphasis added).
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rect a misnomer or misdescription of a defendant."43 On this view an
amendment prompted by a misspelling or misdescription that would
formerly have been characterized as a "mere misnomer" would now
be governed by the stringent requirements of the second sentence of
rule 15(c). Those requirements demand that the intended defendant
receive notice of the institution of the action "within the period provided by law for commencing the action against him." Of course,
such notice is provided only by service of process, not by filing, and
many states do not require service before a limitations deadline. 44
Thus a "mere misnomer" easily correctable by an amended pleading
before 1966 could thereafter be cured with relation-back effect only in
the relatively unlikely event that the intended defendant received some
kind of notice of the original action before a limitations period expired.
If, as the Advisory Committee's parenthetical phrase suggests, a
court decides that a misdescription or misspelling does work a change
of parties, it must then grapple with the component requirements of
the second sentence of rule 15(c). What is the substance of the notice
and knowledge the intended defendant must have received or gained?
Through what means must the required notice be given? And, most
troublesome, by what deadline must that notice and knowledge be
complete? To approach these questions let us start, in the traditionalist mode, with the work of the Advisory Committee.
The Advisory Committee's note observed that the decisions under
the original rule were problematic "most acutely in certain actions by
private parties against officers or agencies of the United States.''45 It
cited four federal district court decisions issued within the preceding
eight years that had denied amendments under rule 15(c) where plaintiffs had named the United States or a federal agency or department
instead of the particular federal officer designated by statute as the
defendant. 46 The Committee observed that the policy of the particular
federal statutes of limitations at issue would not have been offended by
allowing amendment, because the United States had been "put on notice of the claim within the stated period . . . by means of the initial
43. FED. R. C1v. P. 15(c) advisory committee's note to the 1966 amendment, reprinted in 39
F.R.D. 69, 82 (1966) [hereinafter Advisory Committee note].
44. Note, Federal Rule, supra note 25, at 103. A majority of states require only filing, not
service, before a limitations period expires. See note 230 infra and accompanying text; see also
Haworth, supra note 33, at 563.
45. Advisory Committee note, supra note 43, 39 F.R.D. at 82.
46. Cohn v. Federal Sec. Admin., 199 F. Supp. 884, 885 (W.D.N.Y. 1961); Hall v. Department of Health, Education, & Welfare, 199 F. Supp. 833, 834 (S.D. Tex. 1960); Sandridge v.
Folsom, 200 F. Supp. 25, 27 (M.D. Tenn. 1959); Cunningham v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 541,
542 (W.D. Mo. 1958).
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delivery of process to a responsible government offi.cial."47 The Committee, citing these cases, wrote that "incorrect criteria have sometimes been applied, leading sporadically to doubtful results." 48 At the
same time, it noted that the "relation back of amendments changing
defendants has generally been better handled by the courts" in actions
involving private parties.49
Apparently referring to both the governmental defendant and private-party actions described immediately above, 50 the Committee
stated in summary that its proposed amendment "amplified" rule
15(c) "to provide a generru solution."51 In language the Supreme
Court has since relied on to support a strict interpretation of the
amendment, 52 the Committee then wrote:
An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if the amendment satisfies the usual condition of Rule 15(c) of
"arising out of the conduct ... set forth ... in the original pleading,"
and if, within the applicable limitations period, the party brought in by
amendment, first, received such notice of the institution of the action the notice need not be formal - that he would not be prejudiced in
defending the action, and, second, knew or should have known that the
action would have been brought against him initially had there not been
a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party. 53

The pertinent text of the new rule 15(c) conforms closely to the
foregoing quotation from the Committee's note, with an arguably significant exception. The note's phrase "within the applicable limitations period" appears in the amended rule itself as "within the period
provided by law for commencing the action against him" (with "him"
referring to "the party to be brought in by amendment"). This language, together with the added paragraph designed to provide specifically for the government-defendant cases, 54 was duly approved in
succession by the Judicial Conference's Standing Committee, the full
47. Advisory Committee note, supra note 43, 39 F.R.D. at 83. The Schiavone plaintiffs read
these cases somewhat differently. They considered it "virtually certain that notice to the government came after the short limitations period, but within the penumbra or grace period for later
service of process under Rule 4." Brief of Petitioners, Schiavone v. Fortune, 106 S. Ct. 2379
(1986) (No. 84-1839) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file).
48. Advisory Committee note, supra note 43, 39 F.R.D. at 83.
49. Id.
50. By negative pregnant there is another indication in the note that the Committee designed
its "general solution" for both private-party and governmental defendant cases. The sentence
following the Committee's detailed description of its test explains that a new, second paragraph
which the amendment also adds to rule 15(c) applies to the government cases only.
51. Advisory Committee note, supra note 43, 39 F.R.D. at 83.
52. Schiavone v. Fortune, 106 S. Ct. 2379, 2385 (1986).
53. Advisory Committee note, supra note 43, 39 F.R.D. at 83 (emphasis of the "within"
phrase added).
54. See note 50 supra.
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Judicial Conference, the Supreme Court, and finally the Congress,
which failed to veto it within the ninety-day period prescribed by the
Rules Enabling Act. 55
The Committee thus "amplified" its general test for relation back
to cover private- and government-defendant cases without distinction.
Its note begins by observing: "Rule 15(c) is amplified to state more
clearly when an amendment of a pleading changing the party against
whom a claim is asserted (including an amendment to correct a misnomer or misdescription of a defendant) shall 'relate back' to the date of
the original pleading."56 That the new test appears designed to expand the circumstances in which relation back would be allowed is
indicated by the Committee's critical references to the restrictive government-defendant decisions 57 and by its indirect but apparently approving citation to decisions that had allowed relation back against
private defendants. 5 s
Admittedly, this introduction to the note could also be read to suggest that the Committee intended to contract the scope of relation
back in some circumstances in which federal courts had usually allowed it. While the text of the amendment itself applies the relationback test only to amendments "changing" the party defendant, the
parenthetical phrase in the first sentence of the Committee's note suggests that such changes occur even when the originally named defendant is merely misnamed or misdescribed. As observed above, courts
for many years before the amendment had allowed relation back under
"misnomer," "misdescription," or "identity of interest" concepts, applying only the easily satisfied "claim arising out of" test of the original rule 15(c). Relation back was frequently approved when the
original service was made either upon the intended defendant, his
agent, or a closely related entity, at least where the name endorsed on
the original complaint was not that of another extant person or corporation. 59 Indeed relation back was allowed in some of these cases even
though only filing, and not service of the original complaint, was completed within the period of limitations. 60 Thus Professor Haworth
concluded that under the Advisory Committee's parenthetical phrase
"[a]mendments previously allowed as a matter of course will now be
SS. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).
S6. Advisory Committee note, supra note 43, 39 F.R.D. at 82.
S7. See note 46 supra and accompanying text; see also Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, S4 GEO. L.J. 1204, 123S-37 (1966).
S8. See Advisory Committee note, supra note 43, 39 F.R.D. at 83. These private-party decisions are discussed in more detail in text at notes 206-17 infra.
S9. See Haworth, supra note 33, at SS9-62.
60. Id. at S62.
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subjected to a fairly rigorous test, a procedure considerably more stringent than past practice." 6 1
Still, the only cases which the Advisory Committee pointed to in
explaining the desirability of an amendment to rule 15(c) were those in
which it believed relation back had been unfairly denied. Accordingly,
some courts, concerned lest formerly correctable misnomers would
now be unamendable under the requirements of the rule's second sentence, continued to handle misnomer or misdescription amendments
under the loose "arising out of" test of the first sentence. Thus where
an intended natural person defendant was misnamed, or a defendant
corporation was misdescribed as incorporated in one state rather than
another, many courts in the decade after the 1966 amendment continued to allow the amendment even though the strict requirements of
the second sentence of rule 15(c) could not be met. 62 In the words of a
contemporary edition of a standard treatise:
[W]hen an amendment merely involves correcting a misnomer and does
not entail the actual "changing" of the parties, it should be allowed as a
matter of course as long as it satisfies the standard in the first sentence of
Rule 15(c) and without regard to the special requirements of the second
sentence of the subdivision. 63
Professor Haworth concluded that "courts are ignoring the Advisory
Committee's intent [to treat misnomer and misdescription cases under
the stringent standards of the second sentence] in order to avoid what
they must consider to be an unduly harsh result." 64 Whether this was
in fact the Committee's "intent," or rather an inference about its intent resulting from sloppy drafting, is an open question.
Commentators have sought to circumvent the purport of the parenthetical phrase by differentiating those misnomers and misdescriptions that actually change the identity of a defendant from those that
do not. Professors James and Hazard argue for relation back whenever the defendant sought to be added by amendment
was fully aware of the suit from the beginning. This may happen when
the process mistakenly describes a nonexistent corporate entity but is
served upon defendant and is actually recognized for what is intended; or
where the action is mistakenly brought against an existing entity, but the
wrong one, because substantive liability rests upon another entity closely
related in financial interest to the first. 65
61. Id. at 556. See also id. at 561-62.
62. Id. at 556-58.
63. 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1498, at 513
(1971), quoted in Haworth, supra note 33, at 557 n.23.
64. Haworth, supra note 33, at 557.
65. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 25, at 220 (emphasis added). These scholars were
confident that in the first-described situation, "the amendment is generally held to relate back."
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But what is meant by notice "from the beginning"? The Supreme
Court, in Schiavone, would permit relation back on an "identity of
interest" rationale only if the intended defendant had been made
aware of the suit before the expiration of the period of limitations. 66
Professors James and Hazard apparently contemplate that an action
may be timely although the intended defendant receives notice of the
suit, through service of process mistakenly describing a nonexistent
corporate entity, after a period of limitations expires, provided that the
complaint was filed before that deadline and the applicable law permits service of process thereafter. Only where the new defendant has,
before amendment, "really been a stranger to the case" - where she
has received neither formal nor informal notice of the pendency of an
action sufficient to alert her to her status as an intended defendant would they defer to limitations concerns and deny relation back. 67
Professor Moore, too, has attempted a general formulation to distinguish between mere misnomers and changes of parties. His test
inquires
whether, on the basis of an objective standard, it is reasonable to conclude that the plaintiff had in mind a particular entity or person, merely
made a mistake as to the name, and actually served the entity or person
intended, or whether plaintiff actually meant to serve and sue a different
person. 68

Read literally, this test plainly errs in focusing solely on p/aintijf's
state of mind and thus in trampling unduly on the policies supporting
statutes of limitations. It ignores the defendant's interest by failing to
specify some time by which the plaintiff must have carried out the
original, faulty service. As will be seen, Schiavone makes short shrift of
such a test. The plaintiffs there did have in mind a particular entity,
filed a timely complaint, merely made a mistake in naming the entity,
and actually served an agent of the intended defendant within the period the Federal Rules allowed for service of a correctly captioned
summons and complaint. But they failed to effect service of the defective summons and complaint on the intended defendant's agent until
after the limitations period had expired. In the Supreme Court's construction of rule 15(c), that service failed to give notice to the misnamed intended defendant "within the period provided by law for
commencing the action against him."
In any event, at least a few courts did apply the relatively unforgivId. The Supreme Court held otherwise in Schiavone v. Fortune, 106 S. Ct. 2379 (1986). See text
at notes 165-228 infra. For a similar test see Cohn, supra note 57, at 1235.
66. 106 S. Ct. at 2384.
67. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 25, at 220.
68. 2 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE~ 4.44, at 4-418 (2d ed. 1987).
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ing standards of the 1966 amendment to misnomer or misdescription
situations, insisting that the intended defendant receive the two kinds
of notice described by the second sentence of rule 15(c) before the expiration of the limitations period. 69 Noting that the main current of
decision was inconsistent with these results, 70 commentators complained about "varying standards for allowing pleading changes to relate back" and concluded "that the attempt by the Advisory
Committee to eliminate these variations has largely failed" 71 and that
"inconsistent results are still a frequent occurrence."72

D.

The Second Decade of the 1966 Amendment to Rule 15(c): Does
the Rule 15(c) Notice Deadline Mean What
It Appears To Say?

Despite the rear-guard action of those lower courts that refused to
apply the strict requirements of the 1966 amendment to misnomers, 73
and the significant scholarly criticism74 of the 1966 amendment as its
first decade drew to a close, no further amendment was forthcoming.
The next decade would see not only continued confusion about the
kinds of alterations to complaints which worked a change of defendants and thus triggered application of the strict requirements of the
second sentence, but also heightened debate about the meaning of one
of those requirements, the notice deadline date.
During the first decade, rule 15(c) was still commonly held to allow relation back against intended defendants who would have had
good limitations defenses in state court. 75 The same result was also
sometimes reached by different means. When a plaintiff could not satisfy the strict notice requirements of rule 15(c) in a diversity action,
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit applied instead a more generous relation-back rule of the forum state, placing higher value on
preserving the plaintiff's claim than on restoring the defendant's repose.76 But at the dawn of the second decade, in 1978, the Third Cir69. See, e.g., Graves v. General Ins. Corp., 412 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1969); People of the
Living God v. Star Towing Co., 289 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. La. 1968).
70. See text at notes 62-64 supra.
71. Haworth, supra note 33, at 559.
72. Note, Federal Rule, supra note 25, at 96.
73. See text at notes 62-64 supra.
74. See Haworth, supra note 33, at 559-62; Note, Federal Rule, supra note 25, at 108-14.
75. See, e.g., Welch v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 466 F.2d 1344 (5th Cir. 1972); Loudenslager v. Teeple, 466 F.2d 249 (3d Cir. 1972); see also Hageman v. Signal L.P. Gas, Inc., 486 F.2d
479, 483-85 (6th Cir. 1973).
76. Marshall v. Mulrenin, 508 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1974). But a district court in the First
Circuit refused to apply the Mulrenin approach in a federal question case. Magno v. Canadian
Pac. Ltd., 84 F.R.D. 414 (D. Mass. 1979).
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cuit squarely rejected the First Circuit's position that a forum state's
more liberal relation-back rule supersedes the notice deadline of rule
15(c). 77 This rumbling foreshadowed a more basic disagreement during the remainder of the second decade about the meaning of the rule
15(c) deadline itself.
For example later in 1978 a creative, if clumsy, opinion of the Second Circuit purported to redefine the rule 15(c) notice deadline flexibly in order to avoid the diversity "anomaly" that results when a
federal court applies a literal definition of the deadline in a state with a
more relaxed attitude toward the statute of limitations. 78 The anomaly is as striking as it is simple: In a state which permits service after
expiration of the limitations period and requires only filing beforehand, a strict reading of rule 15(c) "bars relation back for late notice
to a new defendant when a like notice to the original defendant would
be timely." 79 To pretermit the anomaly, the Second Circuit construed
the rule 15(c) notice deadline phrase - "within the period provided
by law for commencing the action against him" - to mean the last
day of the limitations period plus whatever additional time the forum
state allowed for service. 80 Two years later, the Fifth Circuit followed
suit with a similarly expansive interpretation of the 15(c) notice
deadline. 81
Subsequently, however, other courts of appeals, confronted with
mounting caseload pressures, went the other way. In succession the
Seventh, 82 Eighth, 83 Tenth, 84 Ninth, 85 and Third86 Circuits construed
the "within" phrase to mean that the intended defendant must have
received the specified kinds of notice (of the institution of the action
77. Britt v. Arvanitis, 590 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1978).
78. Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 940 (1979). This
anomaly was first judicially noticed in a frequently cited district court decision issued shortly
before the effective date of the 1966 amendment. Martz v. Miller Bros. Co., 244 F. Supp. 246 (D.
Del. 1965). The anomaly was most recently alluded to, although not specifically addressed, in
Justice Blackmun's opinion for the majority in Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2382·83.
79. Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2383.
80. Ingram, 585 F.2d at 571. The Second Circuit misapplied this test, however, by permitting relation back even though service of process on the intended defendant was completed after
the 60-day grace period for timely service then permitted by New York law. See text at notes
109-25 infra.
81. Kirk v. Cronvich, 629 F.2d 404, 408 (5th Cir. 1980).
82. Hughes v. United States, 701 F.2d 56, 58 (7th Cir. 1982).
83. Trace X Chem., Inc. v. Gulf Oil Chem. Co., 724 F.2d 68, 70-71 (8th Cir. 1983) (allowing
relation back because the intended defendant received the prescribed notice from the originally
served defendant before the limitation period ran).
84. Watson v. Unipress, Inc., 733 F.2d 1386, 1390 (10th Cir. 1984).
85. Cooper v. United States Postal Serv., 740 F.2d 714, 716 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1022 (1985).
86. Schiavone v. Fortune, 750 F.2d 15, 18 (3d Cir. 1984), ajfd., 106 S. Ct. 2379 (1986).
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and of the probable mistake in defendants) before the limitations period had run, regardless of more forgiving rules for timely commencement prevailing in the courts of the forum state. Some of these
decisions recognized that such strict interpretations of the rule posed
what the Third Circuit referred to as an "Erie question" 87 for federal
diversity courts in states which permit service after a limitation period
expires or apply a relation-back rule more flexible than rule 15(c).
But the full extent of the litigation provoked by the 1966 amendment to rule 15(c) is not reflected in these splits of authority among
the circuit courts of appeals. To plumb the depths of the confusion the
1966 amendment spawned, I surveyed the rule 15(c) notice deadline
decisions of all the federal courts since 1980, when the Supreme Court
decided Walker v. Armco Steel Corp. 88 The Court there held that Federal Rule 3, which provides that an action is commenced by the filing
of the complaint, was not intended "to toll a state statute of limitations" but merely to mark "the date from which various timing requirements of the Federal Rules begin to run." 8 9 Having found no
other federal rule on point, the Court applied a state law on timely
commencement which required the plaintiff to file and complete service of process before the limitations period had run. The Court expressly declined to reevaluate the suggestion of Ragan v. Merchants
Transfer & Warehouse Co. 90 that Federal Rule 3 should govern timely
commencement in federal question cases.9 1
Accordingly, Walker, while settling a diversity issue, raised new
questions about the then-prevailing view that the complaint-filing
benchmark of rule 3 defines timely commencement in federal question
actions. 92 The House Committee on the Judiciary later took note of
this remaining interpretive problem,93 but it did not consider any
amendment to rule 3, either to overturn Walker's diversity holding or
to address the federal question issue Walker explicitly reserved. Congressional inaction on this point thus left intact the many decisions
that imbue rule 3 with statute of limitations significance in federal
question cases, although Walker denies that significance to rule 3 in
diversity cases. The divergence is a bit bizarre, since nothing in the
87. Schiavone, 750 F.2d at 18.
88. 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
89. 446 U.S. at 750-51.
90. 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
91. 446 U.S. at 751 n.11.
92. See text at note 144 infra.
93. See statement by Rep. Edwards of the House Judiciary Committee, commenting on proposed amendments to Federal Rule 4 that were ultimately enacted in 1982. H.R. REP. No. 7154,
97th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4434, 4441 n.14.
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text or history of rule 3 suggests that the filing of a complaint has
limitations significance under one head of jurisdiction but not the
other.
In deciding to focus on the post-Walker opinions interpreting rule
15(c), I reasoned that the courts would have to confront not only the
stingy "literal" reading of the notice deadline favored by the emerging
majority of the court of appeals decisions, 94 and the more generous
reading given by two courts of appeals a few years earlier, 95 but also
the import of Walker. After all, the crux of the difficulty surrounding
rule 15(c) is whether that federal rule stipulates any constant deadline
by which the kinds of notice the rule requires must be received by the
intended defendant. Since Walker holds that no similar deadline is
declared by Federal Rule 3 (or presumably by any other federal
rule)96 for the timely commencement of diversity actions against correctly named defendants, I expected attentive lower federal courts to
question whether rule 15(c) provides any fixed notice deadline for the
far rarer situation of relation back. For example, I wondered whether
the courts would seize on the "against him" language in rule 15(c) as
indicating that the drafters intended the relation-back notice deadline
to vary with state law timely-commencement standards, at least in actions founded on diversity.
What I found was a bewildering patchwork of seemingly ad hoc
approaches to the problem reflected in scores of lower court decisions
issued between 1980 and 1986 alone. The rulemakers' neglect of rule
15(c) produced abundant jurisprudential casualties. I will portray the
extent and magnitude of these problems, and the resulting drain on
judicial resources, in two ways. First, I will discuss the most recent
body of reported97 diversity and federal question decisions that have
grappled with the variety of interpretive approaches to the notice
deadline issue. Second, I will rehearse the painful progress through
the federal judicial system of Schiavone, which represents the culmination of two decades of litigation generated by the 1966 amendment.
1.

The Diversity Cases

Most striking are those decisions that apparently approve the
94. See cases cited in notes 82-86 supra.
95. Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 940 (1979); Kirk v.
Cronvich, 629 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1980) (discussed in text at notes 78-81 supra.)
96. Ringrose v. Engelberg Huller Co., 692 F.2d 403, 409 (6th Cir. 1982) (Jones, J.,
concurring).
97. I know of no reliable way to gauge what proportion of the relation-back decisions result
in opinions or how many such opinions are reported. It is somewhat suggestive, though, that
some of the opinions cited in the following discussion are reported only unofficially.
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Martz anomaly98 by denying a plaintiff who has named the defendant
incorrectly the benefit of a state-law grace period which would have
been available to serve a defendant named correctly. Some of these
decisions recognize expressly that this interpretation places a misnamed defendant in a more advantageous limitations posture than a
correctly named defendant for no apparent reason. 99 Others do not
refer directly to the conflict between a strict reading of rule 15(c) and
more liberal state timely-commencement rules, but the existence of
such a conflict emerges from the facts. 100
It may be said in support of these results that they are based on a
straightforward, if by no means inevitable, 101 reading of the rule 15(c)
phrase "within the period provided by law for commencing the action
against him." But this reading fails to attend to the teachings of
Walker. It simply assumes that the drafters of the rule intended to
create a unitary federal definition of timely commencement for relation-back purposes in the face of Walker's conclusion that rule 3 embodies no similar definition for timely commencement against
defendants named correctly. Further, this reading of the phrase's supposed "plain language," when juxtaposed with the holding of Walker,
implements the perverse, unexplained policy of according wrongly
named defendants the greatest possible measure of repose - even if
the forum state's own timely-commencement or relation-back rules
protect them less - while subjecting correctly named defendants to
the vagaries of state law.
A second and larger category of the diversity cases consists of
those which read the "within" phrase strictly without any mention of
the forum state's timely-commencement or relation-back rules or even
of the limitations and service dates from which those rules might be
deduced. 102 These "unrecognized anomaly" cases create a discrep98. See notes 78-79 supra and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., Tretter v. Johns-Manville Corp., 88 F.R.D. 329, 332 (E.D. Mo. 1980). The
court wrote without explanation that it did "not agree that such a result is necessarily anomalous
or unfair." 88 F.R.D. at 332.
100. See Cook v. Starling, 594 F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Mcclanahan v. American Gilsonite Co., 30 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1163 (D. Colo. 1980). These actions were filed one
day before the period of limitations expired, but service on correctly named defendants was not
made until some time thereafter. The actions were considered timely commenced as against the
correctly named, but not the added, defendants.
101. For example, this reading gives no independent significance to the words "against him."
They may suggest that timely commencement depends on the particular act, such as filing or
service, by which a given jurisdiction considers a limitations period "tolled." The marker event
may vary even among states that use a common limitations period. See text at notes 219 & 223

infra.
102. See Watson v. Unipress, Inc., 733 F.2d 1386 (10th Cir. 1984); Norton v. International
Harvester Co., 627 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1980); Colonial Mortgage Serv. Co. v. Aerenson, 603 F.
Supp. 323 (D. Del. 1985); Ridge Co. v. NCR Corp., 597 F. Supp. 1239 (N.D. Ind. 1984);
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ancy between the treatment of correctly and wrongly named defendants only in forum states that afford a post-limitations grace period,
but all of them rest on a wooden reading of the 15(c) deadline phrase
and ignore the import of Walker.
By contrast, other courts found several ways around the seemingly
literal interpretation of the rule 15(c) deadline date. That is, they allowed the relation back of amendments that added defendants who
first received notice that an action was pending against them only after
a limitations period expired. Some courts in this group reached this
result by heeding the implications of Walker, allowing relation back
whenever the intended defendant received the prescribed notice within
a grace period authorized by the "tolling" (actually, timely-commencement)103 provisions of a forum state. 104 Others reached the
same generous result without regard to timely-commencement provisions of state law. They construed the rule 15(c) notice deadline date
to include that "reasonable" time after filing which, until 1983, federal
courts had typically allowed for service of process under the then-prevailing interpretation of Federal Rule 4; 105 or they treated the filing of
the complaint as affording some sort of "constructive notice"; 106 or
they simply ignored whether the intended defendant received notice
before a limitations period expired. 107 Both of the principal routes to
relaxing the rule 15(c) deadline date - deference to forum state
timely-commencement rules or reference to the rule 4 requirements
for timely service of process - have their seeds in the Second Circuit's
confused opinion in Ingram v. Kumar. los
Mahinpour v. Smith, 35 Fed R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 403 (D.D.C. 1982); Swiss v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
559 F. Supp. 621 (D.R.I. 1982); Davis v. Cadwell, 94 F.R.D. 306 (D. Del. 1982); Greenfield v.
Kanwit, 87 F.R.D. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
103. Strictly speaking, "tolling" refers to any suspension of the running of the statute of
limitations, whether occurring before or after the period begins to run. "Commencement" has
been confusingly defined as "the activity that permanently tolls the statute oflimitations." Note,
Commencement Rules and Tolling Statutes of Limitations in Federal Court: Walker v. Armco
Steel Corp., 66 CORNELL L. REV. 842, 842 n.2 (1981). It is somewhat more illuminating to
consider commencement as the particular event, usually filing or service, which a jurisdiction
requires to have been completed before, or within a stated time after, the last day of the period of
limitations.
104. Hunt v. Broce Constr., Inc., 674 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1982); Florence v. Krasucki, 533
F. Supp. 1047 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).
105. Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 940 (1979);
Calabretta v. National Airlines, 528 F. Supp. 32 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
106. Itel Capital Corp. v. Cups Coal Co., 707 F.2d 1253 (1 lth Cir. 1983); Silva v. American
Home Assurance Co., 36 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
107. Sounds Express Intl. Ltd. v. American Themes & Tapes, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 694
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
108. 585 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 940 (1979).
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The Hydra-Headed Ingram Model

The Ingram opinion meanders through most of the loose analytic
dead ends to which rule 15(c) decisions have led since the 1966
amendment. Perhaps Ingram struck the Second Circuit as an appealing vehicle for expansively interpreting the 15(c) deadline date because
the originally served and intended defendants had unusual, identical
last names and unusual, almost identical first names. 109 Yet they were
geographically separated and had no known connection, so that service on the originally named defendant could not reasonably be said to
have afforded any notice to the intended defendant. In any event,
although the action was filed two weeks before the limitations period
expired, service was not made upon the intended defendant until almost four months thereafter.
The court started by assuming, on the authority of its decision ten
years earlier in Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co., 110 that the mere filing of a complaint commences a federal diversity action for statute of
limitations purposes even if timely service of process is required in the
forum's own courts. 111 Sylvestri was arguably in conflict with the
Supreme Court's decision in Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 112 which had held that federal courts sitting in diversity
must follow the timely-commencement rules of the forum state.
Sylvestri in effect prophesied that the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Hanna v. Plumer, 113 which declared in broad terms the superior authority of virtually every applicable federal rule over
inconsistent state law, would ultimately demand the overruling of
Ragan. By finding rule 3 not on point, and thus leaving state timelycommencement provisions as the only remaining source of law, the
Supreme Court in Walker proved that prophecy false.
The question the Second Circuit faced in Ingram was whether the
mere filing of a complaint timely commences an action even where the
plaintiff has named the wrong defendant and service on the intended
defendant is made only after the statute has run. Although the court
noted that rule 15(c) was amended in 1966 "to establish criteria that
would lead to more uniform and equitable results," 114 it resisted the
109. The original defendant was named "Dr. Vijaya N. Kumar"; the intended defendant was
named "Dr. Vijay S. Kumar." 585 F.2d at 567.
110. 398 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1968).
111. 585 F.2d at 568.
112. 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
113. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
114. 585 F.2d at 569 (citing Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REv. 356, 407-10 (1967)).
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temptation to let the plaintiff off the hook by classifying the case as a
"mere misnomer" and hence allowing relation back pro forma under
the first sentence of subsection (c). 115 In particular, the court eschewed "mere misnomer" analysis because the intended defendant
knew nothing of an aborted attempted service upon the misnamed
defendant and had received no notice himself until several months after the statute had run. 11 6
Turning to the heart of the matter, the meaning of the 15(c) notice
deadline phrase, the court then seemed to advocate deference to the
forum state's timely-commencement rule as a way of avoiding the
anomaly of Martz v. Miller Brothers Co. 117 In this vein the court condemned a "literal interpretation" of the deadline phrase as
unjustified in jurisdictions where timely service of process can be effected
after the statute of limitations has run. In those jurisdictions, even an
accurately named defendant may not receive actual notice of the action
against him prior to the running of the statute of limitations. Yet there
is no doubt that the action against him is timely commenced. There is
no reason why a misnamed defendant is entitled to earlier notice than he
would have received had the complaint named him correctly. 118
115. When, as here, the mistaken complaint names an actual person or entity in existence,
it is not obvious whether the amendment corrects a "misnomer" or brings in a truly "new"
party. Analysis of "relation back" under these circumstances is better accomplished
through application of the specific guidelines in the second sentence of Rule 15, than by
attempting to draw an arbitrary line between misnomers and changes of party.
585 F.2d at 570.
In support of this point, the court relied on the "weight of authority" as exemplified by six
cases. 585 F.2d at 570 n.7. These decisions allowed relation back upon concluding that the
intended defendants had received the notice required by the second sentence of rule 15(c).
Wynne v. United States ex rel. Mid-States Waterproofing Co., 382 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1967);
Travelers Indem. Co. v. United States ex rel. Construction Specialties Co., 382 F.2d 103 (10th
Cir. 1967); Horwitt v. Longines Wittnauer Watch Co., 388 F. Supp. 1257, 1258-59 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); Mitchell v. Hendricks, 68 F.R.D. 564, 566 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Davis Water & Waste Indus.
v. Jim Wilson, Inc., 67 F.R.D. 509 (E.D. Tenn. 1974); Brittian v. Belk Gallant Co., 301 F. Supp.
478 (N.D. Ga. 1969). The majority might have added to this list Craig v. United States, 479 F.2d
35 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1023 (1973) (disallowing relation back because the
notice the intended defendant received did not meet the second-sentence standards).
Examination of the cited cases, however, discloses that only two, Wynne and Brittian, were
"true" misnomer cases in the sense that the intended defendant, although misnamed, was the
entity first actually served. It is not surprising that the plaintiffs in each of the four other cases
were required to meet the difficult standards of the second sentence of rule 15(c), since their
proposed amendments changed defendants by almost any standard. But it is not apparent why
the four remaining cases constitute significantly weightier authority than the four other cases and
the treatise statement cited by the court earlier in the text which had approved the relation back
of misnomers under the far more lenient "claim arising out of" test prescribed by the first sentence of rule 15(c). 585 F.2d at 570 (citing Armijo v. Welmaker, 58 F.R.D. 553 (D. Ariz. 1973);
Washington v. T.G. & Y. Stores Co., 324 F. Supp. 849, 856 (W.D. La. 1971); Wentz v. Alberto
Culver Co., 294 F. Supp. 1327, 1328-29 (D. Mont. 1969); Fricks v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.,
46 F.R.D. 31, 32 (N.D. Ga. 1968); 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 63, § 1498, at 51314).
116. 585 F.2d at 571.
117. 244 F. Supp. 246 (D. Del. 1965); see notes 78-79 supra and accompanying text.
118. 585 F.2d at 571 (footnote omitted).
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The court fortified this interpretation by referring to a criticism of the
Martz case, written one year after the rule 15(c) amendment went into
effect, by Professor Benjamin Kaplan, who had been a reporter for the
Advisory Committee in 1966.119
The state-deference approach, which the court thus approved formally, had the virtue of fulfilling the apparently expansive intent of the
1966 rule amenders and of sidestepping the Martz anomaly. Yet the
court's interpretation is not evident, to put it mildly, from the face of
rule 15(c). The deadline phrase is' pegged to "the period provided by
law for commencing the action against him," not "the period provided
by the law of the forum state (or of some other state to which the
forum state might refer) for commencing the action against him, including any grace period for service of process." Further, this approach is not well calculated to promote uniformity among the federal
courts, since the states follow several different patterns for timely commencement.120 Moreover, as a matter of internal consistency, deference to liberal forum-state law on timely commencement seems
somewhat at odds with Ingram's adherence to Sylvestri, which lets
Federal Rule 3 control timely commencement against defendants
named correctly, notwithstanding contrary rules of the forum state.
In any event, after charting this state-deference path, the Ingram
court abruptly left it. It went on to "hold" in the next paragraph that
under Rule 15(c) the period within which "the party to be brought in"
must receive notice of the action includes the reasonable time allowed
under the federal rules for service of process. We think this interpretation is permissible and desirable and carries out the beneficent purpose of
the 1966 amendment.121

But Federal Rule 4 did not at the time specify any fixed deadline
within which process must be served. 122 Accordingly, the court applied twin standards developed by decisions interpreting rule 4(a) and
rule 41(b), the involuntary dismissal rule, to assess timeliness: it inquired whether the Ingram plaintiff had acted diligently to perfect service after the statute of limitations expired and whether the defendant
had been prejudiced by the delay. Under those standards, the court
119. Kaplan, supra note 114, at 410 n.204.
120. See text at note 230 infra.
121. 585 F.2d at 571-72 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
122. Effective February 26, 1983, Federal Rule 4 was amended to require that service of the
summons and complaint must be made upon the defendant within 120 days after a complaint is
filed. It provides for dismissal of the action without prejudice for failure to meet that deadline,
absent a showing of good cause why service could not have been completed timely. FED. R. C1v.
P. 4(j). The question whether this deadline was intended to serve as a marker for statute of
limitations purposes, or only to address the independent requirement of prosecuting with due
diligence, is discussed in text at notes 129-30 and in note 147 infra.
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concluded that the "lapse of several months between the time the error
was discovered and the time the [intended] defendant was served . . .
was not so unreasonable as to justify dismissal of the claim," even
though the delay in service was not "fully explained by the
plaintiff." 123
The court did not explain why it ultimately defined the 15(c) notice
deadline by reference to the "reasonable" time that rules 4 and 41 then
permitted for service of process, instead of by reference to the timelycommencement law of the forum state. The only evident explanation
is one the court would probably have been embarrassed to confess:
application of New York's sixty-day grace period in Ingram would not
have saved the plaintiff's claim, since the intended defendant first receive~ notice of the action a full two months after that grace period
expired.
The Federal Rules/service of process approach which the Second
Circuit ultimately applied does largely avoid the Martz anomaly. The
anomaly would persist only under the few state timely-commencement
or relation-back rules so open-ended that they would deem an action
timely commenced against defendants who first receive notice more
than a "reasonable" time - or now, under Federal Rule 4(j), more
than 120 days 124 - after filing. 125 The court's approach also promotes
formal - and now, under rule 4(j)'s fixed 120-day service period, actual - uniformity among federal courts on the question of a relationback notice deadline. Further, by sustaining claims of which an intended defendant receives no notice until months after the limitations
period expires, this approach furthers the apparent liberalizing aims of
the 1966 amenders.
But the Federal Rules/service of process approach also assumes,
oversimply, that the "law" in the phrase "within the period provided
by law for commencing the action against him" means federal law. It
thus disrespects the timely-commencement rules of the many states
that require that the intended defendant be notified of the action earlier than 120 days after the expiration of the statute of limitations. 12 6
Implicitly Ingram, like Sylvestri, rested on the false prediction that
Hanna overruled Ragan; the Ingram court therefore somewhat conveniently took for granted that state timely-commencement rules may be
disregarded in the face of a combination of federal rules - 15(c), 4,
123. 585 F.2d at 572.
124. See note 122 supra.
125. An open-ended state law provision of this type is discussed in text at notes 132-33 &
139-42 infra.
126. See text at note 230 infra.
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and 41 - lightly assumed to be "on point." 127 Today, this approach
offends Walker v. Armco Steel Corp. 12s by assuming that rule 3 governs timely commencement in diversity actions. It is also at least indirectly at odds with more recent decisions, including one by the Second
Circuit itself, 129 which hold that compliance with the 120-day service
deadline of rule 4(j) merely satisfies a separate requirement for prosecuting an action with due diligence and does not by itself commence
an action timely for purposes of a state statute of limitations.13°
127. The Second Circuit was by no means alone in erroneously predicting that Hanna betokened the demise of Ragan. See, e.g., c. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF FEDERAL
COURTS § 59, at 277 (3d ed. 1976); Smith v. Peters, 482 F.2d 799, 802 (6th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974); Manatee Cablevision Corp. v. Pierson, 433 F. Supp. 571, 575-76
(D.D.C. 1977); Krout v. Bridges, 58 F.R.D. 560, 561 (N.D. Iowa 1973); Comment, A Restrained
Adherence to Ragan - State versus Federal Rules when Tolling State Limitation Periods in Diversity Actions, 18 S.D. L. REV. 185, 199-200 (1973).
128. 446 U.S. 740 (1980). See Fischer v. Iowa Mold Tooling Co., 690 F.2d 155, 157 (8th Cir.
1982) ("Walker v. Armco Steel has laid to rest the notion that Rule 3 can ever be used to toll a
state statute of limitations in a diversity case arising under state law."); see also Morse v. Elmira
Country Club, 752 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1984); Saraniero v. Safeway, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 749 (D. Kan.
1982). Some courts, however, have distinguished Walker on the ground that the Supreme Court
explicitly found there that the Oklahoma timely-commencement rule was "an 'integral' part of
the statute of limitations." Walker, 446 U.S. at 752. Courts following this distinction say they
would feel bound to adhere to state law if state judicial decisions had declared a timely-commencement rule to be integrally related to a statute oflimitations. See Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins.
Co. v. City of Claxton, 720 F.2d 1230 (11th Cir. 1983); Walden v. Tulsair Beechcraft, Inc., 96
F.R.D. 34 (W.D. Ark. 1982); Foster v. Seattle Tent & Fabric Prod. Co., 31 Fed. R. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) 517 (D. Minn. 1981). At least one commentator has concluded that this distinction
is spurious, that under Walker state timely-commencement rules govern and Federal Rule 3 does
not apply regardless of whether the state commencement procedure is considered integrally related to the limitations scheme as a whole. Note, supra note 103, at 849-50.
129. Morse v. Elmira Country Club, 752 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1984); see also Brown v. Rinehart,
105 F.R.D. 532 (E.D. Ark. 1985) (treating the statute of limitations defense as distinct from the
independent objection that plaintiff had failed to complete service within the 120 days required
by rule 40)); New York State Law Digest, in FED. PROC. L. ED. § 65:43 (1983) (noting that
service must be completed within the statute of limitations period in diversity actions when that
is required by the forum state's law; otherwise the action will be dismissed even if that service
was made within the 120 days specified by rule 4).
130. The Second Circuit in Morse explicitly rejected the plaintiff's argument derived from
Sylvestri that rule 4(j)
effectively adds 120 days to the applicable state statute of limitations if the complaint has
been filed within the limitations period. This is a dubious proposition at best in light of
Walker. Moreover, the legislative history of the amendments shows that Congress recognized the implications of Walker when it considered the amendments to Rule 4(c) and that
Congress specifically considered and rejected the argument plaintiff now advances.
752 F.2d at 42 (citing 128 CoNG. REc. H9850 nn.14 & 15) (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1982) (statement of
Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 96 F.R.D. 81, 120 nn.14-15). Rep. Edwards' analysis of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure Amendments Act of 1982 states that under new rule 4(j) an action
should be dismissed "even if service occurs within the 120 day period, if the service occurs after
the statute of limitations has run." 128 CONG. REC. at H9850 n.15, 96 F.R.D. at 120.
It is somewhat strange that the Second Circuit, having thus effectively recognized that
Walker overrules its holding in Sylvestri, has not also reexamined Ingram, as indeed one district
court in the Second Circuit has suggested it should. A.B. Volvo v. M/V Atlantic Saga, 534 F.
Supp. 647, 649 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). For Ingram, like Sylvestri, ultimately rests on the view
repudiated by Walker that filing per rule 3 timely commences an action for limitations purposes
notwithstanding forum-state timely-commencement provisions to the contrary. See text at notes
126-27 supra.
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The fundamental interpretive problem underlying Ingram's Federal Rules/service of process approach is its assumption that there exists an on-point Federal Rules definition of the rule 15(c) notice
deadline, a proposition which Walker casts sharply in doubt. Since
when Ingram was decided that deadline (drawn from rule 4) was the
protean "reasonable" time after filing, the court's assumption resulted
in a generous approach to relation back. But the problem is not simply that the court locates a definitional benchmark in federal rather
than state law. Complete deference to plaintiff-oriented state law may
also substantially undermine the concern with the statute of limitations evident in rule 15(c).
A 1981 district court decision, Covel v. Safetech, Inc., 131 well illustrates that point. Plaintiff in a diversity action sought to add three
defendants almost four years and six months after the applicable limitations period had expired. Responding to defendant's reliance on rule
15(c), plaintiff pointed to "an unusually liberal [state] relation-back
rule" 132 which categorically permitted party-changing amendments to
relate back to the original pleading "[w]henever the claim or defense
asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original
pleading." 133 The state statute after which the rule was patterned had
been construed to permit relation back whenever "the plaintiff intended to bring it against the party [actually] liable for the injury." 134
The district court found "compelling indicia" that the 1966
amendment to rule 15(c) was designed "to prescribe a more liberal
rule of relation-back than some federal decisions had applied in construing the less explicit provisions of Rule 15(c) as it stood before
amendment." 135 It therefore fashioned a strained, expansive construction of Federal Rule 15(c) which avoided a direct conflict with the
even more liberal Massachusetts rule. The court concluded that rule
15(c), read literally, "states only an affirmative proposition - that an
amendment changing a party relates back if prescribed conditions are
satisfied. It does not state the negative proposition that an amendment
changing a party does not relate back when these conditions are not
satisfied." 136 Because the court doubted that rule 15(c) was "designed
131.
132.
133.
134.
(1904)).
135.
136.

90 F.R.D. 427 (D. Mass. 1981).
90 F.R.D. at 429.
MASS. R. C1v. P. 15(c).
90 F.R.D. at 429 (quoting McLaughlin v. West End St. Ry., 186 Mass. 150, 71 N.E. 317
90 F.R.D. at 432.
90 F.R.D. at 432.
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to override a more liberal state law provision of relation back," 137 it
found rule 15(c) inapplicable and concluded that it "should not be
applied when to do so would give it the practical effect of preempting a
state relation-back rule that is an integral part of the state's law of
limitation of actions and is more liberal than the federal rule." 138
In this respect the district court was following in the footsteps of
its court of appeals, which, in Marshall v. Mulrenin, 139 had reached a
similar result for a somewhat different reason. The First Circuit gave
rule 15(c) a more natural reading, under which the action would have
been untimely because the intended defendant did not receive notice of
the action until after the limitations period had expired. But the court
also found that the open-ended Massachusetts relation-back provision 140 reflected a "discoverable substantive, as distinguished from a
merely procedural, state purpose." 141 It therefore held, notwithstanding Hanna v. Plumer, that the on-point federal rule must yield. 142
Mulrenin has been subjected to sharp scholarly criticism on the
ground that it improperly sidestepped Hanna's mechanical preference
for "on-point" federal rules in favor of a relatively subjective Erie
analysis geared to the perceived intensity of a state's limitations policies.143 Whatever the merits of this Erie debate, the critics themselves
unwittingly follow Mulrenin in simply assuming the answer to the fundamental question: Does rule 15(c), fairly read, comprehensively stipulate all the standards that govern the relation back of party-changing
amendments, or must one key component of the rule, the notice deadline, be borrowed from state law? While it seems more likely that in
1966 the Advisory Committee and_ the Supreme Court had in mind a
wholly national approach to the problem, Walker raises a genuine
137. 90 F.R.D. at 432.
138. 90 F.R.D. at 433.
139. 508 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1974).
140. At the time, the Massachusetts relation-back rule was codified in MASS. GEN. L. ch.
231, § 51 (1959) (amended 1973), which was later replaced by MASS. R. C1v. P. 15(c), at issue in

Covel.
141. 508 F.2d at 44.
142. 508 F.2d at 44. The court explained that the state's substantive purpose was no less
clear because the legislature had chosen to define timely commencement for relation-back purposes in a separate statute instead of proceeding "within the four comers of the statute of limitations' formal provisions." For other authority on the "substantive" bite of limitations statutes,
see Clinton, Rule 9 of the Federal Habeas Corpus Rules: A Case Study on the Need for Reform of
the Rules Enabling Acts, 63 lowAL. REv. 15, 59 (1977); Ely, The Irrepressible Myth ofErie, 81
HARV. L. REV. 693, 725-27 (1974).
143. See, e.g., Note, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure - The Erie Doctrine - State RelationBack Provision Found Controlling Over Rule 15(c) - Marshall v. Mulrenin, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV.
952 (1975); Note, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure - Statute of Limitations - State Policy Relation Back, 9 AKRON L. REV. 199 (1975).

Michigan Law Review

1534

[Vol. 85:1507

question whether rule 15(c) succeeded in expressing such a national
standard.
3.

The Federal Question Cases

Several of the approaches taken in the post-Walker diversity cases
find counterparts in actions based on a federal question. Of course in
the federal question setting, interpretation of the 15(c) deadline phrase
is unencumbered by conflicts between federal and state law. Still, the
fundamental questions have no inevitable answers. First, do the Federal Rules define timely commencement at all? While the Supreme
Court held in Walker that rule 3 was not intended as a timely-commencement rule in diversity cases, the Court, as mentioned above, 144
explicitly refused to rule on Ragan's suggestion that rule 3 filing suffices to "toll" a statute of limitations in suits to enforce rights under a
federal statute. Second, if rule 3 filing does have a tolling effect,
should the federal courts adopt it as the event that will satisfy the rule
15(c) relation-back deadline, or should they interpret the rule 15(c)
notice phrase to demand service of process before the limitations deadline, with the resulting restrictive consequences?
On the surface it seems bizarre for lower federal courts to view rule
3 as a timely-commencement rule for federal question cases, given
Walker's holding that the same rule was not so intended for diversity
cases. In terms rule 3 draws no distinction between the two heads of
jurisdiction, and the Advisory Committee's note concerning rule 3
sheds no additional light on this point. The lower federal courts, however, have apparently dismissed this problem as a pedantic quibble.
The pre-Walker tradition of using rule 3 as a "tolling" rule for federal
question cases has survived Walker largely intact. The vast majority
of courts faced with the question have simply observed that Walker
did not explicitly reject the view that rule 3 tolls statutes in federal
question cases. 145 Indeed, even the few courts that have insisted that
both filing and service be completed within the period of limitations
144. See text at note 91 supra.
145. See, e.g., Jordan v. United States, 694 F.2d 833 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Caldwell v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 632 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1980); Moorehead v. Miller, 102 F.R.D. 834 (D.V.I.
1984); Wells v. City of Portland, 102 F.R.D. 796 (D. Or. 1984); Prather v. Raymond Constr.
Co., 570 F. Supp. 278 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Robbins v. Marine Transp. Lines, 531 F. Supp. 14
(D.N.J. 1981); Badillo v. Central Steel & Wire Co., 495 F. Supp. 299 (N.D. Ill. 1980); see also 2
J. MOORE, supra note 68, ~ 3.09[2]; Siegel, Practice Commentary on Amendment ofFederal Rule
4 (Elf. Feb. 26, 1983) with Special Statute of Limitations Precautions, 96 F.R.D. 88, 101 (1983).
All but one of these cases was "commenced" - that is, the complaint was filed - before
February 26, 1983, the effective date of rule 4(j). That explains why these decisions conclude
that the intended defendant need only receive notice within a "reasonable time," rather than 120
days, after filing. In the action commenced after rule 4(j) became effective, the intended defen·
dant received notice within 120 days after filing, so rule 4(j) would not have changed the result.
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for timely commencement of a federal question action apparently
rested their decisions on the belief that such service was implicitly required by the particular federal statute at issue, rather than by rule
3.146

Even after Walker, then, filing under rule 3147 timely commences
federal question actions against correctly named defendants. It is
therefore not surprising that many post-Walker federal question decisions have also allowed relation back under rule 15(c) against misnamed defendants who were first notified of the commencement of
actions only after a limitations period expired. 148 What is somewhat
surprising is that roughly as many courts have come out the other
way. 149 These courts, including most of the courts of appeals that
have addressed the point, read the rule 15(c) deadline phrase literally.
They require that some form of notice of the institution of the action
be communicated to the intended defendant before the federal limita146. See, e.g., Thompson v. Ralston Purina Co., 599 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Mich. 1984) (action
under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982)); see also
Ralston Purina Co. v. Barge Juneau & Gulf Caribbean Marine Lines, 619 F.2d 374 (5th Cir.
1980) (admiralty action). The latter case may not survive the Fifth Circuit's decision handed
down six months later in Caldwell v. Martin Marietta Corp., 632 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1980).
147. Rule 4U) has held no appeal as an alternative measure of timely commencement in cases
based on federal questions. As in the diversity cases, see text at notes 129-30 supra, rule 4(j),
which requires that service of process be complete within 120 days after filing, has been viewed
solely as a rule regulating diligent prosecution. See, e.g., Porter v. Beaumont Enter. & Journal,
743 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1984) (assuming that the facts warranted a rule 4U) dismissal without
prejudice, they also warranted a dismissal with prejudice for failure to satisfy a federal statutory
period of limitations); Burks v. Griffith, 100 F.R.D. 491 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (dismissing action
without prejudice under rule 40) but noting that any attempt at refiling would be met with a
successful challenge under a state period of limitations borrowed in a federal civil rights action).
Professor Moore has gone so far as to suggest that even if filing alone tolls a statute of limitations,
and a complaint is timely filed, a subsequent "dismissal under Rule 4U) will result in the action
being time-barred ifthe statute has run after the filing of the complaint." 2 J. MOORE, supra note
68, ~ 4.46, at 4-435. See generally Siegel, supra note 145, at 107-08 (noting the problem but
suggesting no definitive answer).
148. See Kirk v. Cronvich, 629 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1980); Allen v. Bolger, 597 F. Supp. 482
(D. Kan. 1984); Maiden v. Biehl, 582 F. Supp. 1209 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Murray v. United States
Postal Serv., 569 F. Supp. 794 (N.D.N.Y. 1983); United States ex rel. Arrow Elec., Inc. v. G.H.
Coffey Co., 100 F.R.D. 413 (D. Me. 1983); A.B. Volvo v. M/V Atlantic Saga, 534 F. Supp. 647,
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); Swann Oil, Inc. v. MIS Vassilis, 91 F.R.D. 267 (E.D.N.C. 1981); Bush v.
Sumitomo Bank & Trust Co., 513 F. Supp. 1051 (E.D. Tex. 1981); Hart v. Bechtel Corp., 90
F.R.D. 104 (D. Ariz. 1981); cf Turner v. Winn Dixie, Inc., 31 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1443
(N.D. Ga. 1981) (adopting the reasonable time approach of Kirk v. Cronvich, but finding on the
facts that service three weeks after filing and twenty days after the expiration of the limitations
period was not made within a "reasonable time").
149. Allen v. Veterans Admin., 749 F.2d 1386, (9th Cir. 1984); Cooper v. United States
Postal Serv., 740 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1022 (1985); Williams v. United
States, 711 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1983); Hughes v. United States, 701 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1982);
Stewart v. United States, 655 F.2d 741 (7th Cir. 1981); Westfield v. Rhodes-Perdue Furniture
Co., 109 F.R.D. 106 (W.D.N.C. 1985); Wickfall v. Bolger, 102 F.R.D. 466 (W.D. Tenn. 1984);
Bruce v. Smith, 581 F. Supp. 902 (W.D. Va. 1984); Murray v. United States Postal Serv., 550 F.
Supp. 1211 (D. Mass. 1982); Larry v. Penn Truck Aids, Inc., 94 F.R.D. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1982);
Robbins v. Marine Transp. Lines, 531 F. Supp. 14 (D.N.J. 1981).
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tions period runs out, even though a correctly named federal question
defendant would often have to settle for considerably later notice and
even though no state law demands better notice. Some of the opinions
recognize expressly that this stingy approach to relation back creates a
purely federal anomaly: under rule 15(c), the misnamed defendant
will be entitled to better notice - that is, notice before the limitations
period expires - than he would be assured by rule 3 had he been
named correctly. 150
Still, the slim majority of the reported cases holds, consistent with
the dominant interpretation of rule 3, that an intended federal question defendant is never entitled to notice before the limitations period
expires, even if he was first named erroneously. This line of decisions
simply transplants the holding of Ingram v. Kumar to the federal
question setting. These courts have determined that the rule 15(c) notice deadline includes the "reasonable time" after filing which, until
rule 4 was amended in 1983, most courts applying Federal Rule 3 151
allowed for completion of service of process. On their facts these federal question cases are indistinguishable in any significant respect from
those that demand notice to the intended defendant before the limitations period expires. 152 Those courts that allow relation back when
notice would have been timely against a correctly named federal question defendant place greatest emphasis on avoiding a senseless Federal
Rules anomaly or on furthering the apparent goals of the 1966 amenders. The courts opting for the strict approach express greater concern
for adhering to the most natural meaning of the critical deadline
phrase in rule 15(c).
4. Shuffles and Sidesteps
Faced with such massive confusion in the decisions about the
meaning and application of the deadline phrase, and mindful of the
harsh or merely irrational results attendant upon the state-federal or
150. See, e.g., Korn v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, 724 F.2d 1397, 1402 (9th Cir. 1984)
(W{lllace, J., dissenting).
151. I have uncovered no reported decisions which gauge the rule 15(c) notice deadline with
reference to the rule 4(j) 120-day period for service. Perhaps this is because both rule 4(j)'s
drafters, see H.R. REP. No. 7154, supra note 20, at 4442, and its judicial interpreters in federal
question cases, see decisions cited at note 147 supra, have unanimously agreed that rule 4(j) has
no limitations significance but simply constitutes an independent barrier to the progress of a civil
action based on inadequate diligence of prosecution.
152. Most strikingly, compare Murray v. United States Postal Serv., 569 F. Supp. 794
(N.D.N.Y. 1983) (party was "Mary Murray"), with Murray v. United States Postal Serv., 550 F.
Supp. 1211 (D. Mass. 1982) (party was "Nancy A. Murray") (both actions under Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1982)); compare Allen v. Bolger, 597 F. Supp. 482 (D. Kan.
1984), with Wickfall v. Bolger, 102 F.R.D. 466 (W.D. Tenn. 1984) (both actions under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1982)).
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federal-federal anomalies, a number of courts have worked out artful
dodges. Three approaches will be mentioned briefly.
Some courts expressly recognize that deference to forum-state law
might permit relation back even if the intended defendant first received notice after the limitations period expired. Rather than resolve
the potential conflict between state and federal law, these courts recommend further fact-finding in the hope of learning that the intended
defendant did receive some sort of notice before the last day of the
statute of limitations, the earliest possible notice deadline under a.Ily
interpretation of the rule 15(c) phrase. 153
A second tack was taken by a district court154 sitting in the Third
Circuit after that circuit had opted for a strict interpretation of the
deadline phrase in Schiavone. The district court relied on forum-state
decisions which had estopped intended defendants from invoking the
statute of limitations when their own fraud or concealment had prevented a plaintiff from discovering their actual identity. Finding such
inequitable conduct, the court allowed relation back even though the
intended defendant had first received notice of the institution of the
action after the limitations period expired.
The court reasoned that because rule 15(c) explicitly referred to
the statute of limitations that is "provided by law," the rule implicitly
"imports into the federal rules the statute of limitations of the forum
state. It must also therefore import those doctrines [like estoppel] that
have been judicially created to inform the analysis of statute of limitations problems." 155 By a parity of reasoning, one would also expect
the limitations defense to be informed by state timely-commencement
and relation-back rules. Yet the Third Circuit in Schiavone had explicitly refused to allow a liberal New Jersey relation-back rule to inform its own interpretation of rule 15(c). 156 Thus the district court's
technique displays a superficial fidelity to the law of the circuit, while
in fact contradicting the court of appeals' ultimate rationale in order
to achieve a result the lower court thought just.
A third approach, also used to skirt apparent Erie problems,
emerged in a jurisdiction that authorizes "John Doe" pleadings. In
one diversity action, 157 the forum state's law gave plaintiffs three years
from an action's commencement to amend their "Doe" complaints to
153. See Ringrose v. Engelberg Huller Co., 692 F.2d 403, 405 (6th Cir. 1982); Gabriel v.
Kent Gen. Hosp., 95 F.R.D. 391, 393-94 (D. Del. 1982).
154. Layton v. Blue Giant Equip. Co. of Canada, 105 F.R.D. 83 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
155. 105 F.R.D. at 86.
156. Schiavone v. Fortune, 750 F.2d 15 (3d Cir. 1984), a.ffd., 106 S. Ct. 2379 (1986).
157. Lindley v. General Elec. Co., 780 F.2d 797 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2926
(1986).
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reflect a defendant's true identity and to effect service of process. For
limitations purposes, the state courts had considered such a "Doe"
defendant to be a party to the action from its commencement. Under
the state procedure, then, the amended complaint adding the defendant's real identity would have been timely; under the circuit's prevailing strict interpretation of rule 15(c), the action would have been time
barred because the defendant had not received any notice of the institution of the action within the period of limitations.
Reviewing the district court's dismissal of the action under rule
15(c), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals framed the issue as whether
forum-state law or rule 15(c) "applies." 158 The court treated the forum state's relation-back procedure for "Doe" pleadings as effectively
extending the underlying period of limitations by three years, and it
was undisputed that the amended complaint correctly naming the
defendant was served within that expanded period. The court accordingly considered that no relation-back rule, either state or federal,
came into play at all. In brief, "the asserted conflict between Rule
15(c) and state Doe practice is 'bogus.' " 15 9
A variation on this approach has been applied in a jurisdiction that
authorizes use of a fictitious name to identify a defendant whose name
is then unknown and permits the relation back of amended complaints
that reflect the defendant's real identity. Case law treated the date of
filing of the original complaint as the date that interrupts the running
of the period oflimitations. 160 A federal district court, sitting in diversity, recognized that such an action would be time-barred unless the
amendment substituting the defendants' correct names were allowed
to relate back, but it also concluded that relation back was precluded
under rule 15(c). 161 Because the district court was within the same
circuit that had decided Marshall v. Mulrenin, 162 it was apparently
bound to hold that a liberal local relation-back law should prevail over
rule 15(c), since the application of the federal rule would defeat "substantive state rights." 163 Avoiding such a direct collision between local law and rule 15(c), the court achieved the same result by
concluding that the Federal Rules, including rule 15(c), "do not deal
158. 780 F.2d at 799.
159. 780 F.2d at 800-01 (quoting 19 c. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4509, at 158 (1982)).
160. E.g., Santiago v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 539 F. Supp. 1149, 1153 (D.P.R. 1982).
161. Santiago, 539 F. Supp. at 1152.
162. 508 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1974); see notes 139-43 supra and accompanying text.
163. Santiago. 539 F. Supp. at 1153 (citing Mulrenin and Covel v. Safetech, Inc., 90 F.R.D.
427 (D. Mass. 1981)).
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with the particular problem of John Doe defendants." 164 Consequently, the only relation-back law remaining in the picture was the
local law, under which relation back would revive the "Doe"
complaint.
E.

Schiavone v. Fortune

1.

The Decisions Below

This cacophony of conflicting opinions culminated in the Supreme
Court's decision in Schiavone v. Fortune. 165 Plaintiffs brought suit for
libel in United States District Court in New Jersey, grounding jurisdiction on diversity. Although plaintiffs intended to sue Time, Inc. for
allegedly defamatory statements contained in an article published in
Fortune Magazine, an internal division of Time, the caption of the
complaint identified the defendant as "Fortune." In the body of the
complaint Fortune was described as "a foreign corporation having its
principal offices at Time and Life Building."1 66
The complaint was filed ten days before the running of the applicable New Jersey statute of limitations. Mail service was not made until
one day after the statute ran, however, and the complaint was not received by Time's agent for service until three days after that. Time's
agent forwarded the summons and complaint to Time with accompanying correspondence which reflected the agent's understanding that
the intended defendant was Time, rather than the nonexistent entity
"Fortune." Of course, even the agent did not gain this understanding
until it received the mail service, four days after the limitations period
had expired. Two months later, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint
which the lower federal courts and the Supreme Court all considered
adequate to denominate Time as the defendant. 167
Time did not dispute that the action was timely filed under Federal
Rule 3. It agreed, or at least did not deny, that service upon its agent
several days after the limitations period ran would have been timely if
the defendant had been named correctly; service of the original complaint two weeks after filing was not only well within the 120-day period specified by Federal Rule 4(j), but also apparently timely under
the rules that would be applied by a New Jersey court. In effect, Time
164. 539 F. Supp. at 1153. But see Varlack v. SWC Caribbean, Inc., 550 F.2d 171, 174 (3d
Cir. 1977); Sassi v. Breier, 76 F.R.D. 487, 489 (E.D. Wis. 1977), ajfd., 584 F.2d 234 (7th Cir.
1978) (holding that the standards of rule 15(c) do apply to "John Doe" pleadings).
165. 106 S. Ct. 2379 (1986).
166. 106 S. Ct. at 2381.
167. 106 S. Ct. at 2381-83, 2385 (majority opinion), 2386-87 (Stevens, J., dissenting), ajfg.
750 F.2d 15 (3d Cir. 1984), ajfg. 38 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 71, 73 (D.N.J. 1983).
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stood on the Martz anomaly. It argued that as a misnamed defendant
it was entitled to notice of the institution of the action before the running of the limitations period even though, had it been named correctly, it would not have been entitled to any earlier notice than it in
fact received. On this theory Time moved for summary judgment,
contending that the action was time barred.
Plaintiffs' response to the motion was initially limited to two arguments. First, they contended that their amendment corrected a mere
misnomer and did not change a party; the requirements of the second
sentence of rule 15(c) would therefore be wholly inapplicable. The
district court acknowledged the difficulty of choosing between these
characterizations of the amendment but found it unnecessary to decide
the matter. It relied on the parenthetical phrase from the Advisory
Committee's note which suggested that the new standards were
designed to cover all amendments, "including an amendment to correct a misnomer or misdescription of a defendant." 168 Accordingly,
the court found that the second-sentence standards governed the case.
Turning to those standards, the district judge then noted "an apparent dispute among the courts" as to whether the rule 15(c) notice
deadline "includes a reasonable period to effect service." 169 Concluding that the "language of the rule, referring to commencement of the
action, does not contemplate an added period for service of process,"
the judge added that "[t]he parties have not presented this issue to the
court." 170 He ruled that the amendment could not relate back under
rule 15(c) because Time had not received notice of the institution of
the action, through its agent, until several days after the limitations
period had expired. m
The court also made short work of plaintiffs' second argument,
that Time had inequitably masked its true name in the boilerplate of
the Fortune Magazine masthead. The editorial pages of the issue
which prompted plaintiffs' complaint stated that Fortune was a registered trademark of Time, Inc. The court found "no basis to conclude
that Time, Inc. deliberately misled plaintiffs to believe that Fortune
was a separate corporation." 172 Summary judgment was therefore entered for Time.
In support of a motion for reconsideration, plaintiffs at last urged
168. 38 Fed. R. Serv. 2d at 75 (quoting Advisory Committee note, supra note 43, 39 F.R.D.
at 82 (1966)).
169. 38 Fed. R. Serv. 2d at 75 n.l.
170. 38 Fed. R. Serv. 2d at 75 n.1.
171. 38 Fed. R. Serv. 2d at 75.
172. 38 Fed. R. Serv. 2d at 76.
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directly that the court construe the rule 15(c) deadline phrase to include the "reasonable" time after filing 173 which the Second Circuit
had permitted in Ingram v. Kumar. 174 The district court acknowledged that it had not cited Ingram in its earlier opinion. But the court
stated that it had considered and rejected the Ingram approach and
would adhere to the ruling, set out in a footnote of its first opinion,
that the rule 15(c) notice period ends on the last day of the statute of
limitations. 175
Alternatively, plaintiffs argued that their amended complaint
should be permitted to relate back under New Jersey law. They cited
several New Jersey cases that permitted amendments adding new
defendants to "relate back even though the parties to be added had not
received notice of the action within the limitations period." 176 Plaintiffs contended that lower federal court decisions under rule 15(c)
which had followed the state-deference approach that Ingram espoused (but did not actually apply) were consistent with the permissive New Jersey approach and should therefore control. 177
The court "reluctantly" concluded that it was "bound by the language of Rule 15(c) to adhere to its prior ruling." 178 It read Britt v.
Arvanitis, 179 a Third Circuit decision, to hold that one of the New
Jersey opinions relied on by the plaintiffs interpreted the New Jersey
relation-back rule as merely a "procedural" one which therefore, by
force of Hanna v. Plumer, must give way to Federal Rule 15(c). The
court further wrote that the plaintiffs had "conceded" that the New
Jersey rulings "are procedural only, not substantive." 180 Yet it is not
apparent from the context of the court's letter opinion that plaintiffs'
attorney did anything more than prudentially acknowledge the inescapable authority of Britt in the Third Circuit.
On appeal, plaintiffs contended that even if an amendment to cor173. In fact, when Schiavone was filed in May 1983 Federal Rule 4(j) allowed only 120 days
to complete service after filing, not the "reasonable" time allowed under rule 4 before it was
amended earlier that year. See note 122 supra.
174. 585 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1978), cert denied, 440 U.S. 940 (1979). See notes 109·25 supra
and accompanying text for a full discussion of Ingram.
175. Schiavone v. Fortune, No. 83-1654, slip op. at 3 (D.N.J. Jan. 10, 1984), reprinted in
Brief of Respondent in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at Appendix A, Schiavone
v. Fortune, 106 S. Ct. 2379 (1986) (No. 84-1839) [hereinafter Brief of Respondent] (LEXIS
Genfed library, Briefs file).
176. Schiavone, slip op. at 4 (D.N.J. Jan. 10, 1984).
177. Schiavone, slip op. at 4 (D.N.J. Jan. 10 1984).
178. Schiavone, No. 83-1654 (D.N.J. Jan. 10, 1984).
179. 590 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1978). See also Lindley v. General Elec. Co., 780 F.2d 797, 800 n.7
(9th Cir. 1986) (noting that the Third Circuit, in Britt v. Arvanitis, had characterized New
Jersey's permissive relation-back scheme as "procedural").
180. Schiavone, slip op. at 4 (D.N.J. Jan.IO, 1984).
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rect a misnomer works a change of party and thus usually falls under
the second sentence of rule 15(c), the Advisory Committee contemplated an exception for those misnomer cases where the original and
intended defendant share an identity of interest. 181 The Third Circuit
found "no support in the rule or the advisory committee note for
plaintiffs' proffered exception." In its view the exception rested on the
premise that Time, the intended defendant, derivatively received notice of the action within the deadline specified by rule 15(c). Relying
on the Advisory Committee's note, the court identified that deadline
as "the [end of the] applicable limitations period." The only notice
Time had received before the limitations period expired, the court
found, was that litigation "might ensue," and rule 15(c) plainly required notice of the actual "institution of the action." Time had therefore not received the prescribed notice within the period limited by
rule 15(c). 182
Like the district court, the court of appeals rejected plaintiffs' argument based on Ingram v. Kumar that the notice deadline should be
extended to include the time ordinarily permitted by state or federal
law for service of process. On this point the court found the language
of the rule "clear and unequivocal, requiring that notice to the defendant occur within the statutory period. While we are sympathetic to
plaintiffs' arguments, we agree with the defendant that it is not this
court's role to amend procedural rules in accordance with our own
policy preferences."183
Plaintiffs, citing Erie and Walker, continued to press their position
that rule 15(c), even if interpreted to deny relation back, should yield
to the more generous relation-back rule of the forum state. The Third
Circuit declined to address that argument on the merits, relying entirely on plaintiffs' purported "concession" that the "New Jersey rule
was procedural only." 184 The court admitted that this concession was
"irrelevant to the proper interpretation of New Jersey law" but found
it "dispositive of plaintiffs [sic] argument on appeal." 18S But plaintiffs'
"concession" may in fact have only acknowledged the authority of
Britt v. Arvanitis. Since Britt was decided before Walker, 186 which indirectly raised some doubt whether rule 15(c) is "on point" in fixing a
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Schiavone, 150 F.2d 15, 17 (3d Cir. 1984).
750 F.2d at 18.
750 F.2d at 18.
750 F.2d at 18.
750 F.2d at 18·19.
Britt was decided in 1978, Walker in 1980.
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notice deadline, the court's disposition of this argument in effect signifies its unwillingness to reexamine Britt in light of Walker.
2.

The Supreme Court Majority's Opinion

Plaintiffs petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari. Time's brief in opposition urged that an expansive definition of the rule 15(c) notice deadline was "properly the subject of the
rule-making, and not the adjudicative process." 187 That proposition
can be questioned. For example, even without further rulemaking, the
Supreme Court could have accepted the expansive interpretation the
plaintiffs sought - at least for diversity actions in states that would
allow relation back - by placing a Walker gloss on the ambiguous
language of the notice deadline and attending to the apparent purposes
of the 1966 amenders. 188 In any event, Time's argument rings somewhat hollow as applied to a federal rule that had been manhandled
through two decades of judicial ministrations without ever gaining the
attention of the rulemakers.
Six Justices of the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Blackmun, began by paying homage to the Rules' overarching goal, expressed in rule 1, of securing ·~ust, speedy, and inexpensive"
determinations, and to the particular mandate of rule 8(f) to construe
pleadings "so ... as to do substantialjustice." 189 The Court also reaffirmed its previous pronouncement "that the spirit and inclination of
the rules [have] favored decisions on the merits, and rejected an approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep may be
decisive." 190 Accordingly, the Court might have been expected to
spurn an interpretation of rule 15(c) that defeats a plaintiff's entire
claim because her lawyer makes a pleading mistake, the correction of
which still affords a misnamed defendant fully as much notice as he
would be entitled to in federal question and most diversity cases had
he been named correctly.
Ultimately, however, the majority was persuaded that the "plain
language" of rule 15(c) demands notice to the intended defendant
"within the applicable limitations period" - the phrase from the Advisory Committee's note. The Court acknowledged that this deadline
187. Brief of Respondent, supra note 175, at 7.
188. Time itself quoted Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 298 (1969), to the effect that existing
judicial interpretations of a federal rule can be altered if the court, "on conventional principles of
statutory construction ... can properly conclude that the literal language or the intended effect
of the Rules indicates that this was within the purpose of the draftsmen or the congressional
understanding." Brief of Respondent, supra note 175, at 19.
189. 106 S. Ct. at 2383.
190. 106 S. Ct. at 2383 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957)).
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reflected "an element of arbitrariness" but observed that arbitrariness
is "a characteristic of any limitations period. . . . [I]t is an arbitrariness imposed by the legislature and not by the judicial process." 191
Indeed, the majority wrote that the rule 15(c) phrase "within the period provided by law for commencing the action against him" was so
clear that the Court did not even face "a choice between a 'liberal'
approach toward Rule 15(c), on the one hand, and a 'technical' interpretation of the Rule, on the other hand. The choice, instead, is between recognizing or ignoring what the Rule provides in plain
language." 192
In reaching this conclusion, I believe that the Court compounded
neglectful rulemaking with slipshod adjudication. It buttressed its
strict reading of the deadline phrase through an exercise in selective
citation. The Court wrote that the "commentators have accepted the
literal meaning of the significant phrase in Rule 15(c) and have agreed
with the Advisory Committee's Note." 193 The accompanying citation
quoted a statement contained in the 1985 supplement to a noted treatise coauthored by Professor Wright, to the effect that the intended
defendant "must have received notice of the action before the statute
of limitations has run." 194 But the Court overlooked the more directly
relevant view of the same author expressed in another recently published work. Professor Wright observes in his federal courts hornbook195 that a court should pause before applying the rule 15(c) notice
deadline so as to bar a diversity action which would be considered
timely commenced under the law of the forum state. In fact, on the
merits, he advances as "the better view" that "the amendment should
be allowed, as permitted by state law, even though Rule 15(c) seemingly does not aut~orize it." 196 Clearly, this construction is more
191. 106 S. Ct. at 2385.
192. 106 S. Ct. at 2385.
193. 106 S. Ct. at 2385.
194. 106 s. Ct. at 2385 (quoting c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 63, § 1498, at 228
(Supp. 1985)).
195. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS (4th ed. 1983).
196. Id. at 383-85. Professor Wright, noting that the Erie problem posed by rule 15(c) "has
given the courts much difficulty,'' wrote that determination of this question presented a "testing
case" for the application of Hanna v. Plumer. He explained that since, under Hamza,
a valid Civil Rule is to be applied without more, [there is] an added burden on the Court and
those who advise it in the rulemaking process. In formulating a rule the rulemakers must
now consider the extent to which application of a proposed rule, in cases where state law is
different, is consistent with the proper ordering of the federal system.
Id. at 383. He thus concluded that a federal court's application of a more liberal state relationback rule would "honor the state's policy decision that a potential defendant's sense of repose is
not so important as to prevent resolution on the merits of state causes of action simply because of
an excusable mistake in the denomination of the defendant." Id. at 383-84. In support of this
view Professor Wright cited several of the decisions that led to the intercircuit conflict Schiavone
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closely on point than Professor Wright's general guidance about interpreting the rule 15(c) notice deadline, which might properly have been
limited to cases based on federal questions. New Jersey did have a rule
which, as construed, may well have allowed relation back on the facts
of Schiavone. Accordingly, it would appear that the Court misconstrued one of the authorities upon which it relied in determining how
much weight to attribute to the "plain meaning" of rule 15(c).
The Supreme Court also failed to mention the permissive New
Jersey relation-back law or the resulting Erie issue ultimately addressed by the district court and decided, however dubiously, by the
Third Circuit. The Court may have been perfectly justified in declining to reach the Erie issue. For example, although the order granting
certiorari was not limited to particular issues, the petitioners' briefs
stressed only two other points. 197 It is precisely such customary constraints of the litigation process, however, which make that process so
unsuited for comprehensive treatment of a problem with so many tentacles - even a problem that calls for nothing more than essentially
arbitrary solutions.19s
The Court did allude to Erie problems indirectly. It noted plaintiffs' protest against a "procedural 'double standard' " whereby Federal Rule 15(c) would bar relation back because of "late notice to a
new defendant when a like notice to the original defendant would be
timely [under Federal Rule 4(j)]." 199 The reference is apparently to
state timely-commencement rules that deem limitations statutes met
by filing alone. But the Court made no mention of state rules on relation back, rules obviously more pertinent to the issue in Schiavone
than rules about timely commencement against defendants named
correctly.
Perhaps the Supreme Court, like the Third Circuit, considered the
Erie question mooted by plaintiffs' "concession." There is at least a
resolved. Yet Schiavone decides that issue the other way - New Jersey apparently did have a
more liberal relation-back rule - without even confronting the Erie/Hanna problem.
197. First, petitioners contended that the initial service of papers naming "Fortune," which
was concededly timely under Federal Rule 4, should have been deemed sufficient as against Time
under an identity-of-interest exception, which would render the second sentence of rule 15(c)
wholly inapplicable. Their fallback position was that even under the second sentence, the deadline for giving notice to the intended defendant should have been construed to include the 120day period for service provided by Federal Rule 4, as distinct from any grace period allowed by
the law of New Jersey. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits, Schiavone (No. 84-1839) (LEXIS Genfed
library, Briefs file).
198. The Court's explicit refusal in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp. to decide whether Federal
Rule 3 provides a timely-commencement definition for federal question cases, see text at note 91
supra, and the resulting split of authority in applying rule 15(c) to those cases, see text at notes
145-52 supra, is another illustration of the point.
199. 106 S. Ct. at 2383.
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serious question whether reliance on any such concession would have
been justified even had the concession been plain. The Court's strict
interpretation of rule 15(c) implicitly overrides the interests of New
Jersey in its permissive relation-back rule, and those interests presumably cannot be waived by a party. 200 The Court's silence on the Erie
question in Schiavone may reflect its recent inclination to avoid deciding difficult procedural issues by relying on doubtful concessions. 201
In any event, the Court might at least have explained why it ignored
such an apparently substantial issue fairly raised in both the lower
courts. 202
As troublesome as the Court's exercise in selective citation is its
failure to probe the authority which formed the basis of the Advisory
Committee's statement that the intended defendant is entitled to notice within "the applicable limitations period." Isolating this one
phrase from a lengthy Advisory Committee note, the Court ignored
the specific context in which that phrase appears. Earlier in the same
paragraph the Committee had concluded that in "actions between private parties, the problem of relation back of amendments changing
defendants has generally been better handled by the courts, but incorrect criteria have sometimes been applied, leading sporadically to
doubtful results." 203 In support of that conclusion, the Committee
cited, among other works, two popular treatises of the time. 204 The
cited treatise sections reveal precisely which private-party cases the
Committee considered "better handled," as well as the "incorrect criteria" which it believed had produced "doubtful results."
From these decisions which the Committee seemingly endorsed by
incorporation, it appears that the dominant judicial tendency before
200. In Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982),
the Court distinguished the personal jurisdiction from the subject matter jurisdiction defense on
the ground that only the former, geared to rights of the individual, is susceptible to waiver. 456
U.S. at 702-03. I am inclined to place Erie questions, once timely raised, in the category of
nonwaivable objections, since the federal and state interests competing for dominance in any Erie
calculus more closely resemble the concerns of subject matter jurisdiction than of the purely, or
at least largely, individual rights at stake in disputes over personal jurisdiction.
201. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415-16 & n.10
(majority opinion), 425 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (1984); Richman, Book Review, 72 CALIF.
L. REV. 1328, 1339 n.46 (1984); Stein, Styles ofArgument and Interstate Federalism in the Law
of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEXAS L. REV. 689, 702 n.66 (1987).
202. The Court did say why it rejected plaintiffs' identity-of-interest argument. It found that
"there was no proper notice to Fortune that could be imputed to Time" because neither Fortune,
the misnamed defendant, nor Time, the intended defendant, received any notice of the institution
of the action until after the limitation period had expired. 106 S. Ct. at 2384.
203. Advisory Committee note, supra note 43, 39 F.R.D. at 83.
204. IA W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 451
(Wright ed. 1960); 1 Id. § 186; 2Id. § 543; 3 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE~ 15.15 (cum. supp.
1962).
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the 1966 amendment was to allow relation back in misnomer or misdescription situations whenever the intended defendant was likely to
have received reasonably timely notice of an action against him
through service of papers denominating him incorrectly. Most important, in many of these cases the original, flawed service was not made
on the intended defendant or its agent until after the period of limitations had expired. Upholding the effectiveness of corrected service after the limitations period was consistent with the then-prevailing
understanding that timely commencement of federal actions required
only filing, provided that service was made within a reasonable time
thereafter. 205
The treatise sections the Advisory Committee cited in tum cite
fourteen relevant decisions. In ten of these, relation back was allowed.206 Yet only one of these ten opinions provides facts sufficient
to show unequivocally that the intended defendant was served with
the original, flawed complaint before the last day of the period of limitations. 207 By contrast, in the most recent appellate opinion in this
group, it is explicit that service of the original, flawed complaint was
not made before the last day of the period of limitations, and the
defendants were not served with an amended complaint until a month
later. 208 In other words, the "right party was before the court,
although under a wrong name," 209 simply because the complaint had
been filed before the expiration of the limitations period; that filing,
coupled with notice within a reasonable time after the statute of limitations ran, sufficed for relation back.
With one exception, 210 each of the other opinions that allows relation back fails to provide facts from which it may be determined
whether actual notice, through service of the original flawed complaint
or otherwise, was received by the intended defendant before the last
205. See Harris v. Stone, 115 F. Supp. 531 (D.D.C. 1953) (for statute oflimitations purposes,
an action is commenced by the filing of the complaint together with timely delivery of process to
the United States Marshal). But see note 216 infra.
206. Jackson v. Duke, 259 F.2d 3 (5th Cir. 1958); Grantley v. Pacific Indem. Co., 217 F.2d
27 (5th Cir. 1954); United States v. A.H. Fischer Lumber Co., 162 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1947);
County Theatre Co. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 166 F. Supp. 221 (E.D. Pa. 1958);
Sechrist v. Palshook, 97 F. Supp. 505 (M.D. Pa. 1951); Williams v. Pennsylvania R.R., 91 F.
Supp. 652 (D. Del. 1950); Stevenson v. Richardson County, Neb., 9 F.R.D. 437 (D. Neb. 1949);
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. ex rel. Silva v. Interstate Equip. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 357 (D.N.J.
1948); Bowles v. Underwood Corp., 5 F.R.D. 25 (E.D. Wis. 1945); Bowles v. Marx Hide &
Tallow Co., 4 F.R.D. 297 (W.D. Ky. 1945).
207. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. ex rel Silva v. Interstate Equip. Corp., 81 F. Supp. at
357, 358.
208. Jackson v. Duke, 259 F.2d at 5-7.
209. 259 F.2d at 5-7.
210. In Williams v. Pennsylvania R.R., 91 F. Supp. at 652, 653, completion of service within
the limitations period is fairly inferable from the dates mentioned in the opinion.
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day of the period of limitations. Nevertheless, the courts permitted
relation back in each case on the theory that the proposed amendment
sought to correct a mere misnomer or misdescription and that a timely
filed complaint was served eventually, either before or after the last
date of the period of limitations. 211 The only constant factor in these
decisions is that the proposed amendments were not perceived as adding a "new party," which apparently meant a person or entity distinct from the originally misnamed or misdescribed defendant. 212
The leading case, which the ten decisions quote extensively, is
United States v. A.H. Fischer Lumber Co. 213 In allowing the relation
back of an amended complaint which corrected both a misnomer and
a misdescription, the Fourth Circuit observed that process had been
served upon an officer of the intended defendant corporation authorized to receive service and that no one was misled by the original mistakes. The court concluded that if process names or identifies the
defendant "in such terms that every intelligent person understands
who is meant ... it has fulfilled its purpose; and courts should not put
themselves in the position of failing to recognize what is apparent to
everyone else."214 Again, the court treated simple filing of the complaint as sufficient to permit relation back. 21 s
The Advisory Committee may therefore have understood the "applicable limitations period" to include the reasonable time after the
expiration of the limitations statute which the Federal Rules then allowed for timely service of a complaint, at least in federal question
cases. 216 The decisions which the Committee apparently approved
211. Typical of these decisions is Sechrist v. Palshook, 97 F. Supp. 505 (M.D. Pa. 1951). It
cannot be ascertained from the report of that case whether service was made, or any other form
of notice provided, before the expiration of the limitations period. Nevertheless, because service
was made (before or after the limitations period expired) on an agent of the intended defendant,
the court concluded that the amendment merely sought to correct a misnomer of a "party al·
ready in Court" who had received "adequate notice [whenever given] of the pendency of the
action" and who therefore "would not be prejudiced in any way" by the relation back of the
amended complaint. 97 F. Supp. at 506-07.
212. Three of the four decisions that deny relation back found that the proposed amendment
would have added a "new party" against whom no action had been timely commenced before the
limitations period ran. Florentine v. Landon, 114 F. Supp. 452 (S.D. Cal. 1953); Kerner v.
Rackmill, 111 F. Supp. 150 (M.D. Pa. 1953); Sanders v. Metzger, 66 F. Supp. 262 (E.D. Pa.
1946). In Kerner and Sanders, the courts concluded that the original summons and complaint
fairly gave notice of an intent to sue only an individual affiliated with a corporation rather than
the corporation itself. The corporation was correctly named for the first time by an amended
complaint which was filed after the statute had run.
213. 162 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1947).
214. 162 F.2d at 873.
215. This is implicit in the context of the court's quotation from a treatise, 39 AM. JuR.
Parties§ 124 (1942), to the effect that relation back should be allowed even if a statute oflimita·
tions runs after a suit has been commenced by filing. 162 F.2d at 874.
216. Curiously, and perhaps advertently, none of the opinions discusses Ragan v. Merchants
Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949). Ragan held that in a diversity case a forum·
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either explicitly or implicitly equated timely commencement with filing alone. None suggested that an intended defendant whose name,
identity, or capacity is corrected by amendment is entitled to any better notice than that received by a correctly named defendant whose
first notice of an action comes through service after a limitations period expires. 217
Alternatively, the Advisory Committee's reference to the "applicable limitations period" may simply have reflected its recognition of
the Supreme Court's decision in Ragan 218 that a federal diversity
court must apply the state's own definition of timely commencement:
if a state requires a defendant to be served with process before a limitations period expires, so must a federal district court. Thus the Committee may have contemplated that in some federal question cases, a
federal court would use a federal statute of limitations as well as federal common law to determine whether filing, service, or both are requisite to timely commencement, while in federal question cases for
which no period of limitations is provided, or in diversity cases, the
federal court would use state limitations periods together with their
associated incidents, including state rules of tolling and timely
commencement.
On this alternate understanding, the Committee's reference to an
"applicable" limitations period works hand in glove with the "against
him" language in the text of the rule 15(c). A given state statute of
limitations expires on a fixed date after the accrual of a particular
claim; but with regard to any particular defendant, a diversity suit
relates back "against him," despite service after that date, if the complaint is filed before service and if filing alone satisfies the forum state's
rules on timely commencement.219 Or "the period provided by law"
for purposes of the rule 15(c) notice deadline might be furnished by a
state's law on relation back rather than its law on ordinary timely
commencement. Yet another possibility is the measure of timeliness
used in federal question cases, where lenient federal common law
state law that requires service of process to be completed before the running of the statutory
period controls over any contrary implications of Federal Rule 3. See text at notes 90, 112supra.
217. No good reason has been advanced for conferring more repose on intended defendants
incorrectly named in an original complaint than on those named correctly. The defendant in
Schiavo11e advanced the justification that plai11tijfs who have caused flawed process to be served
at or near the end of a limitations period "are not in the same positions as plaintiffs who have
sued a properly named defendant within the limitations period; if they were, there would be no
need for Rule 15(c)." Brief of Respondent, supra note 175, at 12. This distinction, though, focuses on the relative equities of plaintiffs, ignoring the focus on defendants which is at the heart
of the policy of repose. See Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965).
218. 337 U.S. 530 (1949); see note 216 supra.
219. Schiavo11e, 106 S. Ct. at 2388 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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marks filing as the critical event and accordingly allows service within
any reasonable time thereafter.220 If this is "the period provided by
law" that supplies the rule 15(c) notice deadline, relation back would
be as expansive as timely commencement in federal question cases,
eliminating the federal/federal anomaly; but in many diversity cases,
relation back would be more expansive than the strict approach to
timely commencement followed by a significant minority of the states,
creating a federal/state anomaly just the converse of the one created
by Schiavone.
Perhaps, however, the Advisory Committee meant to prefer no one
of these plausible meanings of "provided by law" over any other, but
rather to refer to whatever timely-commencement rule would apply to
the particular kind of case had no naming mistake been made. In
other words, by using the phrase "the period provided by law" in the
text of the rule, and by explaining in the accompanying note that this
phrase denotes the "applicable" period of limitations, the Committee
may have intended neither the last day of a statu~e of limitations nor
any universally applicable deadline for giving notice to a misnamed
defendant. Instead, it may have incorporated for relation-back purposes whatever notice deadline, with or without grace period, would
control the fate of a limitations defense in the ordinary case of a correctly named defendant, either under federal law (in federal question
actions) or the law of a particular state (in diversity actions). In diversity cases, the state law referenced by rule 15(c) could theoretically
denote either rules about timely commencement or rules about relation back. On reflection, however, this theoretical ambiguity disappears. Since by hypothesis rule 15(c) would clearly include an
incorporated (although variable) notice deadline for relation back, it
should, by force of Hanna, supplant any inconsistent state rule on that
subject. The rule 15(c) notice deadline therefore would be supplied by
the state's law on timely commencement.
Whatever the merits of these several interpretations of "the period
provided by law," they suggest sufficient ambiguity in the text of rule
15(c) to draw into question the Court's conclusion that the rule's language is "plain." That ambiguity should have led the Court to seek
interpretive guidance in the specific history of the 1966 amendment
and in the generally stated goals of the Federal Rules as a whole.
Bathed in either of those lights, the Court's construction is at least
doubtful. It expresses more than anything the yearning for a simplicity
that just isn't there.
220. See text at notes 145·52 supra.
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The Dissent

Justice Stevens, writing for three dissenters in Schiavone, first argued that the amendment substituting "Time, Inc." for "Fortune" did
not effect a change of party and therefore ought not be tested against
the stringent requirements of the second sentence of rule 15(c). He
explained that "the technical correction" made by the amendment
"added absolutely nothing to any party's understanding of 'the party
against whom' the claims were asserted." 221 Because the plaintiffs had
alleged in the body of the original complaint that Fortune's principal
offices were located at Time's place of business, Justice Stevens found
that "the difference between the description of the publisher of Fortune in the original complaints and the description of the publisher of
Fortune in the amended complaints is no more significant than a misspelling" or misdescription.222
On the assumption that the amendment did change a party and
that the second sentence of the rule therefore applied, Justice Stevens
then tackled the meaning of the rule 15(c) deadline phrase. He
stressed that the words "against him" are crucial because they indicate
that the notice deadline does not refer just to the last date of the limitations period, but also to any later time provided by state or federal
law for the action to be "implemented by the service of process."223 In
this connection he noted that the late Benjamin Kaplan, as reporter
for the Advisory Committee, had criticized the Martz anomaly in an
article published a year after the effective date of the amendments.
Justice Stevens found it curious that the "majority, in relying on the
Advisory Committee interpretation, ignores the reporter's almost contemporaneous understanding."224
The Schiavone holding is equally vulnerable to the criticism that it
creates the purely federal anomaly. Service of the original and even
the amended complaints against Time would have been timely under
Federal Rule 4(j) if Time had been named correctly; that same service,
under a strict reading of the rule 15(c) phrase, is held inadequate only
because Time was named incorrectly. Time's agent understood from
the outset that plaintiffs intended to sue Time. Thus Justice Stevens
considered the notice Time received through service of the original
221. 106 S. Ct. at 2387.
222. 106 S. Ct. at 2388.
223. 106 S. Ct. at 2388. From the accompanying footnote, which quotes approvingly from
Ingram v. Kumar, it appears that Justice Stevens has in mind state rules permitting service of
process after a limitations period expires. His point seems equally applicable to federal question
cases, which even after Walker may be timely commenced by rule 3 filing alone. See text at notes
14546 supra.
224. 106 S. Ct. at 2389 n.4.
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complaint, four days after the limitations period expired, "just as
timely and just as informative as that which would have been received
[under rule 4(j)] if no mistake had occurred."225 He concluded that
the notice Time received would not have prejudiced it in maintaining
its defense on the merits, the ultimate standard expressed in the second
sentence of rule 15(c).2 26
The dissent took the majority to task most strenuously on the
question of the amenders' intent. The cases which "gave rise to criticism of the Rule and the addition of the second and third sentences of
its present text," Justice Stevens wrote, were the government-defendant cases in which relation back had been denied - not the privateparty cases in which relation back had been allowed under the loose
"arising out of" test which then constituted the entire text of the Rule.
He considered it ironic that "it is the language added by the amendment in 1966 to broaden the category of harmless pleading errors
which the Court construes today to narrow that category." 227 As a
different majority of the Court was to comment a week later in disapproving a court of appeals' construction of the 1963 amendment to
rule 56(e), "an amendment ... designed to facilitate the granting of
motions" was thus "interpreted to make it more difficult to grant such
motions. " 228

F.

The Loose Ends of Litigation

Justice Stevens also identified a loose end that Schiavone leaves
dangling. He found it quite possible, given the Court's rationale regarding the supposed clarity of the deadline phrase, that the Court
"would enforce an equally harsh construction of the Rule if the scrivener's error had been a mere misspelling, or perhaps a reference to
Time, Inc. instead of Time, Incorporated."229 This, however, is not
the most important residual uncertainty about the majority opinion.
It is not evident that the Court would enforce its narrow reading of
the rule in all diversity actions or in any actions based on federal
questions.
There are three principal patterns of state timely-commencement
rules. About a third of the states accommodate plaintiffs by treating
the filing of a complaint, without more, as commencing an action for
purposes of limitations. These states require only that service be ac225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

106 S. Ct. at 2389.
106 S. Ct. at 2388-89.
106 S. Ct. at 2389.
Celotex Corp. v. catrett, 106
106 S. Ct. at 2389-90.

s. Ct. 2548, 2554 (1986) (emphasis in original).
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complished within a specified or reasonable time after filing. Roughly
another third erect requirements only slightly more stringent. In these
states the plaintiff must not only file the complaint but also issue or
deliver the summons to a designated officer before the limitations period runs; service may still be accomplished afterwards. The remaining states follow the strict approach - the one probably most
consonant with the principal purposes of a statute of limitations which demands that the defendant be served with process (or receive
some substitute form of notice) before the limitations period
expires. 230
The conventions of adjudication erode our confidence that the
Court would want the Schiavone interpretation of the rule 15(c) deadline phrase to prevail over the more liberal timely-commencement or
relation-back rules of a forum state. New Jersey's timely-commencement law was not relied on at all, either in the district court or on
appeal, and the Supreme Court alluded to the timely-commencement
anomaly only in passing. Moreover, the Third Circuit, citing a supposed concession by plaintiffs' counsel that New Jersey's liberal relation-back rule was merely "procedural," ducked that issue altogether,
and the issue of state relation-back law never resurfaced in the
Supreme Court. Schiavone therefore leaves for still more litigation the
question whether rule 15(c), as there construed, should prevail when
the forum-state law would unquestionably lead to a different result.
Consider, for example, a diversity case factually on all fours with
Schiavone, but with the Erie conflict raised squarely and not deemed
resolved by concession. In Hanna terms, the first question would be
whether rule 15(c) is "on point." After Walker it is arguable that rule
15(c) is not comprehensively on point. That rule's definition of timely
commencement is only somewhat more pointed than that of rule 3,
and the Court in Walker found that rule 3 does not speak to limitations at all. Nevertheless, Schiavone does find a notice deadline in rule
15(c), the last date of the period of limitations.
From the Court's treatment of rule 3 in Walker 231 one would not
have expected the Court to give rule 15(c) such broad sway. Even
though rule 3, certainly more than any other federal rule, appeared on
its face to define filing as the event that would timely commence an
action against a correctly named defendant, Walker concluded that
230. Annotation, Tolling ofStatute ofLimitations Where Process is Not Served Before Expiration of Limitation Period, 27 A.L.R.2d 236 (1953 & Supps. 1970, 1978, 1981 & 1987); 54 C.J.S.
Limitations of Actions §§ 265-68 (1948 & Supp. 1987). These patterns were well established
when the Federal Rules were first adopted. 2 J. MOORE, supra note 68, § 3.03.
231. See text at notes 88-91 supra.
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rule 3 had nothing to say on that subject, at least in diversity cases.
Yet Schiavone now tells us that a cognate timely-commencement rule
is implicit in rule 15(c) with respect to defendants who were not correctly named in the first instance. Putting Walker and Schiavone together, the Court would have us believe that with rule 3 it did not
promulgate a general purpose timely-commencement rule for the
usual case of a correctly named defendant, but that with rule 15(c) it
did promulgate a timely-commencement rule for the far less common
occurrence of misnamed or misidentified defendants.
If the Erie issue were squarely on the table, the Court might continue to view rule 15(c) as comprehensively on point and therefore,
under Hanna, dominant over inconsistent rules of a forum state. But
perhaps, with the matter put directly, the Court might look at the rule
15(c) deadline phrase more closely, revert to Walker's mode of interpreting rule 3, accordingly decide that the rule 15(c) deadline phrase
no more defines timely commencement for relation-back purposes
than rule 3 defines timely commencement in the ordinary case, conclude that the federal/state clash is illusory, and ultimately hold that
federal law should borrow state timely-commencement law to fill the
gap in rule 15(c).
Next, even if we assume that the Court would continue to consider
rule 15(c) fully on point, the Erie analysis requires us to ask if rule
15(c) should nevertheless yield to state law. The Supreme Court has
not yet subordinated to state policies a federal rule which it has expressly found to be on point, but the rule 15(c) deadline phrase could
prove a testing case. 232 It is not controverted that a state's interest in
the policies underlying the selection of a limitations period is a "substantive" state concern to which a federal diversity court must defer. 233 Thus the key inquiry would focus on the closeness of the
relationship between a state's relation-back law and its underlying limitations policies.
In a related context, the Court itself has twice recently written that
state "tolling" provisions are inseparable from the limitations periods
they regulate. The Court has accordingly held that federal courts
which borrow state limitations periods in federal question cases must
also borrow state rules on tolling2 3 4 and its consequences. 235 Further,
although Walker retrospectively rationalizes the Ragan command
(that federal diversity courts follow state timely-commencement rules)
232.
233.
234.
235.

C. WRIGHT, supra note 195, at 384.
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980).
Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650 (1983).
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as resting on the absence of any federal law to the contrary, this is
surely revisionist history. A dispassionate reading of Ragan reveals
that the Court at least assumed that Federal Rule 3 dealt with the
timely-commencement issue but concluded that stricter state rules
must prevail because they are so integrally related to the operation of
underlying statutes of limitations. 23 6
It is difficult to discern why state relation-back rules are any less
bound up with basic limitations policy than state rules on tolling or
timely commencement. Indeed, the rule 15(c) Advisory Committee
wrote that relation back is "intimately" connected with the policy of a
statute of limitations. 237 Furthermore, the opposing federal interests in
a comprehensive relation-back scheme are conspicuously weak: an
uncertain interest in a uniform rule, 238 and a most doubtful interest in
erecting formidable barriers to relation back. 239
In other words, the Court could find rule 15(c) comprehensively
on point and "procedural" within the meaning of the Rules Enabling
Act240 but nevertheless hold that its early notice deadline must bow to
more flexible timely-commencement or relation-back rules of a forum
state. A substantial question remains, even after Hanna, about the
constitutionality of applying a federal rule so as to trench on deeply
held state limitations policy.241 The Court might agree that the subsidiary rules regulating the mechanics of limitations decisions form an
integral part of general state limitations policies. If so, it might further
conclude that those policies would be substantially undermined by a
rule 15(c) override, since the Schiavone interpretation would mandate
the Martz anomaly in the roughly two-thirds of the states that permit
suits against correctly named defendants who are first notified of lawsuits only after a limitations period runs out.
The Court would then face the decision whether Schiavone so sub236. See Ringrose v. Engelberg Huller Co., 692 F.2d 403, 411 (6th Cir. 1982) (Jones, J.,
concurring) (noting that state commencement of suit rules are essential components of state limitations schemes).
237. Advisory Committee note, supra note 43, 39 F.R.D. at 83.
238. After Walker, there is no uniform national approach to timely commencement against
defendants correctly named. It would therefore seem that a uniform notice deadline for the far
fewer cases raising relation-back problems would achieve only patchwork uniformity in this area.
239. In the words of a noted treatise, it was not the purpose of rule 15(c) "to raise a limitations bar that is not supported by the underlying state rule." 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, supra note 159, § 4509, at 159. To the contrary, the apparent liberalizing thrust of the
1966 amendment, see text at notes 56-57 & 206-19 supra, and the more general encouragement
the Rules give to amended pleadings, see FED. R. C1v. P. 15(a), suggest that there is little or no
federal interest favoring a rigid approach to relation back.
240. 28 u.s.c. § 2072 (1982).
241. See note 196 supra. See also Ely, supra note 142, at 726-27 (contending that a federal
rule prescribing a period oflimitations would offend the Enabling Act's prohibition on rules that
abridge substantive rights).
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stantially interferes with these state policies as to invoke Hanna's hypothetical discussion of situations where even an on-point federal rule
should give way. 242 On this question the Court could try to distinguish state rules on ordinary timely commencement from state rules
on relation back. The Court could point out, for example, that the
divergence between a strict approach to rule 15(c) and more liberal
state relation-back rules will do less violence to general Erie policies
than would a divergence between Federal Rule 3 and state rules on
ordinary timely commencement - if only because relation back/misnomer problems occur less frequently. But that explanation might not
sit too well. Is it entirely coincidental that the Court bas respected
state policies when, as in Ragan and Walker, they are conducive to
strict limitations enforcement but bas disregarded them when, as in
Schiavone, they have the effect of reviving an action otherwise barred?
There is somewhat more ground for confidence that the Supreme
Court would apply the strict Schiavone interpretation to federal question cases, despite Schiavone's discontinuity with the prevailing interpretation of Federal Rule 3. 243 Applied to federal questions, the
Court's niggardly linguistic interpretation of Federal Rule 15(c) would
be unopposed by contrary policies of the states. There would therefore
be none of the Erie impetus for generous judicial handling of relation
back that might arguably control this issue in diversity actions in
many states. Still, since jurisdiction in Schiavone itself rested on diversity, the Court had no occasion to consider such arguments as the
desirability of relation back to preserve federal question claims. We
therefore cannot be entirely sure that Schiavone's holding would extend to cases based on federal law.
If the Court were to extend Schiavone to federal question cases, an
action against a correctly named federal question defendant would
usually continue to be timely commenced by rule 3 filing alone, 244 but
relation back would be available only against those incorrectly named
defendants who receive the requisite notice before a limitations period
expires. This haphazard result would echo an existing, even more disturbing discontinuity resulting from the Court's construction of the
Rules. The Schiavone majority rejected plaintiffs' argument that "the
period provided by law" in rule 15(c) should be defined with reference
to the 120-day service period of rule 4 by observing that "Rule 4 deals
only with process." Instead, the Court borrowed its rule 15(c) gapfiller from rule 3, observing that "[u]nder Rule 15(c), the emphasis is
242. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 465-71.
243. See text at notes 145-46 supra.
244. See text at notes 145-46 supra.
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upon 'the period provided by law for commencing the action against'
the defendant," and "Rule 3 concerns the 'commencement' of a civil
action." 2~5 Yet "commencement" as used in rule 15(c) has meaning
only as a component of a limitations scheme, and in Walker the Court
concluded that rule 3 has no limitations significance whatever - at
least for actions which, like Schiavone, are founded on diversity.
III.

PRESCRIPTIONS

A. Rules Versus Decisions
To observe that Schiavone failed to wrap up these loose ends is not
to fault the scope of the Court's opinion. Certainly any observations
the Court might have made about relation back in federal question
cases could be justly branded as dictum. Rather, Schiavone's failure to
treat such questions is the inevitable byproduct of an underlying systemic deficiency. The federal judicial system as a whole has failed in
trying to resolve a multifaceted problem surrounding the interpretation of an amended federal rule through piecemeal adjudication instead of more rulemaking.
To be sure, even extensive amendment of the terms of a procedural
rule will not forestall many potential disputes about its meaning or
application. These must be addressed, at least initially, through caseby-case adjudication. 246 A recent reporter to the Advisory Committee
on the Civil Rules suspects that some number of years of experience
245. 106 S. Ct. at 2385.
246. Adjudication can finally dispose of some loose ends, but it is ill suited to tie up significant numbers of them at once. For example, Schiavone does seem to resolve that rule 15(c)
requires notice of the actual institution of the action, not merely notice that an action might
ensue or that a potential plaintiff was asserting a right. 106 S. Ct. at 2385 (quoting Advisory
Committee note, supra note 43, 39 F.R.D. at 83). This issue, however, was not in great doubt.
The lower federal courts had already generally agreed that newly named defendants must get
notice of the institution of the action, not merely of the facts giving rise to litigation. See
Archuleta v. Duffy's, Inc., 471 F.2d 33, 35-36 (10th Cir. 1973); Craig v. United States, 413 F.2d
854, 858 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 987 (1969); Bazzano v. Rockwell Intl. Corp., 439 F.
Supp. 1167, 1171-72 (E.D. Mo. 1977), revd. on other grounds, 579 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1978); see
also Note, supra note 23, at 682 & n.82. But see Patterson v. White, 51 F.R.D. 175, 177 (D.D.C.
1970) (noting that defendant had received no timely notice either of the institution of the lawsuit
or of its involvement with the incident).
Similarly, by quoting approvingly from the Advisory Committee's 1966 note, the Supreme
Court made it plain that the required notice "need not be formal." Adequate notice may instead
reach the intended defendant wholly outside the channels of a lawsuit or, after an action commences, through documents or events other than service of process. See 106 S. Ct. at 2385. This
proposition, too, enjoyed widespread acceptance among the lower federal courts before Schiavone, even by courts adopting the strictest approach to the deadline for the required notice. See
Korn v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, 724 F.2d 1397 (9th Cir. 1984); Trace X Chem., Inc. v.
Gulf Oil Chem. Co., 724 F.2d 68 (8th Cir. 1983); Longo v. Pennsylvania Elec. Co., 618 F. Supp.
87 (W.D. Pa. 1985); Deal v. Cincinnati Milacron Mktg. Co., 35 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 138
(S.D. Ga. 1982); Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1982);
Swartz v. Gold Dust Casino, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 543 (D. Nev. 1981); Kasko v. American Gage &
Machine Co., 90 F.R.D. 162 (E.D. Pa. 1981). Thus neither of these side issues that Schiavone
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with litigation may be required before it is appropriate to reevaluate a
rule. 247 But there comes a time when the accumulated results of adjudication yield diminishing returns. In the case of rule 15(c), that time
came many years before Schiavone. If, as with rule 15(c), a federal
rule presents interpretive difficulties that are susceptible of arbitrary
resolution, I see no good reason to consign still more lawyers and
judges to wallowing around in the adjudicative abyss when crisp answers are only a statute away.
I am not predicting the likely outcome of further rule 15(c) litigation in the wake of Schiavone; while I may be arguing, not too strenuously, that some departures from Schiavone may be desirable, that is
not the point. The point is that if this procedural morass continues to
be handled by judicial decision alone, all the potential escape valves
will continue to invite relitigation.
The possibility of such relitigation is not chimerical. Since Schiavone, one court of appeals has already been called on to decide a rule
15(c) question far less troublesome than those raised by state relationback or timely-commencement provisions more generous than the
deadline of rule 15(c). The Fifth Circuit, applying Hanna, has now
held that rule 15(c), which allows for the relation back of transactionally related amendments even if the originally asserted claims were
time barred when filed, displaces a forum state rule that restricts relation back to predicate allegations which were themselves asserted
timely. 248 Given the seemingly liberalizing purposes of the 1966
amendment, it will be even less surprising to encounter challenges to
the applicability of rule 15(c) when the rigors of Schiavone would deny
relation back that the forum state's law would allow.
Quite a few lawyers, confronted with dismissal under Schiavone,
may be expected to mount heroic and creative efforts to limit its reach
or carve out exceptions to its rule. This is particularly likely because,
from the plaintiff's perspective, the alternative to making such arguments is the death of a federal lawsuit. I venture that far fewer lawyers would succumb to this temptation if a revised rule 15(c) were to
deal with the principal permutations of the problem that are presented
by all federal question cases and by diversity actions pending in states
with flexible rules about timely commencement or relation back. 249
apparently resolved had been seriously controverted. See generally FED. PROC. L. Eo. § 62:321
(1984).
247. Arthur Miller Describes Federal Rules Revision Process, Changes in Law School E11viro·
ment, THIRD BRANCH, Nov. 1986, at 1, IO (interview with Arthur Miller).
248. Johansen v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 810 F.2d 1377, 1380 (5th Cir. 1987).
249. A preliminary draft of a proposed amendment to rule lS(c) recently considered by the
Advisory Committee makes progress in this direction. It replaces the "period provided by law"

Federal Rule 15(c)

June 1987]

1559

By its very design, a revised federal rule would dictate unitary resolutions of entire classes of cases. Those classes, while sharing some
common characteristics, would admittedly be distinguished by others.
In this sense it is true that the revised rules, like the existing rules,
would be subject to condemnation as "arbitrary." But the arbitrariness of the revised, more particularized rules would be no different in
kind from the arbitrariness of the existing, more general rules; if the
particularized rules address issues which, like relation back, call peculiarly for arbitrary solutions, the aggregate cost to individualized "justice" should be easily eclipsed by the incremental gain in predictability
and efficiency. If, in tum, greater efficiency translates into the speedier
disposition of some federal civil actions, it should pro tanto enhance
(assuming constant resources) the federal judicial system's capacity to
devote greater time and attention to other issues - issues on which
the investment of time and attention may in fact improve the quality
of justice.
B.

Rules Reform and Congestion

The history of rule 15(c) leaves little doubt that a legislative definition of "within the period provided by law for commencing the action
against him" would have saved federal judges and their supporting
personnel a good deal of time. A broader question is whether reinvigoration of the federal civil rulemaking process would promote a general easing of calendar congestion. Reform is fine, but ultimately the
game may not be worth the candle unless it addresses the most serious
and persistent complaint about the federal civil system: judicial delay.
Of all the issues that contribute to delay in civil litigation, surely
the least rewarding are those clustered under the general heading of
procedural litigation. I have in mind here not just the motion practice
generated by such "substantive" procedurar defenses as personal jurisdiction, venue, service of process, or limitations. Equally capable of
producing delay are such clearly ancillary matters as the bona fl.des of
a lawyer's pleading under amended Federal Rule 11 or calculations of
phrase of the current rule with the "time allowed under rule 4 for service of a summons" in a
timely filed federal action. The proposal thus stipulates a fixed, 120-day period after filing within
which the intended defendant must receive the notice specified by rule lS(c).
It has already been necessary since Schiavone for an appellate court to decide that the lS(c)
period, which the Committee's proposed amendment would at last precisely prescribe, prevails
notwithstanding a less generous period prescribed by the relation-back law of the forum state.
See note 248 supra and accompanying text. The proposed amendment should probably also
anticipate the mirror-image issue by expressly adding that the Committee favors application of
the 120-day service period of rule 4 "irrespective of whether state law provides less time or an
open-ended time for relation back in the courts of the forum state." The last question -whether
an open-ended state relation-back period prevails over the notice period of rule lS(c) - was the
subject of litigation even before Schiavone. See text at notes 131-43 supra.
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reasonable attorneys' fees to prevailing parties, both of which turn on
a complicated, unprincipled "balancing" of multiple unweighted factors. It is in this latter realm that Congress (or any legislature) could
fashion rules which, while necessarily arbitrary (and hence of a character well suited for legislative mandate), will at the same time promote the efficient regulation of disputes without palpable harm to
justice between the parties.
Further, in intervening on such matters; Congress need not fear
that it would be poaching on the judicial preserve. On subjects like the
relation back of party-changing amendments, there is little or no need,
at least after a point, to hatch substantive policy through case-by-case
evolution. Nor would legislation on such issues offend the constitutional limits on legislation suggested in Erie, or the parallel prohibition
of the Rules Enabling Act against rules that abridge, enlarge, or modify substantive rights. 25 Finally, aside from serving the end of efficiency, intervention to clear up a rule like 15(c) might also meliorate
some of the more obviously absurd diversity wrinkles bequeathed by
the common law.
The residue of Schiavone is a disturbing instance of the problem.
A federal diversity defendant served with process that names and identifies him correctly, but reaches him after a statute of limitations has
run, will be subject to liability if (but, after Walker, only if) the forum
state's law considers suit timely commenced by filing alone. Yet
Schiavone dictates that this same defendant will elude liability if, fortuitously from his standpoint, the original summons misstates his identity or is mistakenly served on another. The incongruity is even more
pronounced in timely filed federal question cases, regardless of where
those actions may be brought. 251 A revised rule, although necessarily
arbitrary, would more likely treat like cases alike.
Battle-hardened commentators differ sharply about the capacity of
procedure in general, and rules in particular, to ease congestion or
delay. 252 Judge Weinstein, for example, enunciates the traditional

°

250. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941); C. WRIClHT, supra note 195, at 383.
251. Correctly named defendants will be caught (by virtue of the prevailing, post-Walker
interpretation of Federal Rule 3), while incorrectly named or served defendants will escape (by
virtue of the likely application of Schiavone). See text at note 244 supra.
252. A small sample of the burgeoning literature on this subject includes ABA ACTION
COMMISSION TO REDUCE COURT Cosrs AND DELAY, ATTACKING LITIGATION Cosrs AND
DELAY (1984); Symposium: Reducing the Costs of Civil Litigation, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 217
(1985); A. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PRO·
CEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY 2-11

(Federal Judicial Center 1984) (noting the explosion of federal court litigation and attempts by
the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States to address the problem through federal rulemaking proposals); Weller, Ruhnka & Martin, America/I
Experiments for Reducing Civil Trial Costs and Delay, 1 C1v. JUST. Q. 151 (1982); T. CHURCH,
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view that "rulemaking power ... extends the reach of judicial power
by promoting judicial efficiency and by permitting a single decision whether in a case or by a rule - to have a wider impact."253 The
relative disadvantages of litigation have recently been catalogued as
follows: "[A] single proceeding can be very expensive and time-consuming. . . . [T]he expensive process of formal adjudication may have
to be repeated in subsequent cases.... [R]ules of conduct extracted
from an adjudication tend to be considerably less clear in scope and
content than rules that result-from rulemaking." 254 Put more positively, "the rigors of rule making uniformity can be ameliorated by
interpretation in adjudication, while the mere existence of a rule will
forestall many potential cases or provide the basis for summary disposition of many others."255
By contrast, Professor Wright, who has been a member of the Advisory Committee's Standing Committee on Practice and Procedure,
reached the "unhappy conclusion" almost twenty years ago that procedural reform should not be expected significantly to reduce court
congestion or delay. 256 He relied in part on contemporaneous studies
conducted by the Project for Effective Justice (under the supervision of
Professor Maurice Rosenberg, an Advisory Committee member),
which pointed to the lack of evidence that such remedies as the use of
masters, the pretrial conference, or adoption of a comparative negligence rule had improved judicial efficiency. Indeed, in Professor Rosenberg's words, the "chief effect" of procedural devices is "not so
much to change the speed of the flow of cases through the courts as to
change their results."257
This pessimistic view echoes today. Chief Judge Wald of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
citing the report of the ABA Commission to Reduce Court Costs and
Delay, 258 writes that the "legal culture" (more precisely, the culture of
lawyers) "easily triumphed over such reforms as appointment of more
A. CARLSON, J. LEE, T. TAN, K. CHANTRY & L. SIPES, JUSTICE DELAYED: THE PACE OF
LITIGATION IN URBAN TRIAL CoURTS (1978). For an earlier look at the "mid-century law
explosion" and its consequences, see THE COURTS, THE PUBLIC, AND THE LAw EXPLOSION (H.
Jones ed. 196S) [hereinafter THE COURTS].
2S3. Weinstein, supra note S, at 911.
2S4. R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 283-84
(198S).
2SS. Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the Administrative
Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. S71, S92 (1970).
2S6. Wright, supra note 8, at S68, S70, S78, S80, S8S.
2S7. Rosenberg, Court Congestion: Status, Causes, and Proposed Remedies, in THE COURTS,
supra note 2S2, at 29, SS, S7.
2S8. ABA ACTION COMMISSION TO REDUCE COURT COSTS AND DELAY, supra note 2S2.

1562

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 85:1507

judges and promotion of faster timetables. Even the enactment of federal rules may not solve a problem when lawyers and judges prefer to
ignore them." 259 Her example is the infrequent resort by lawyers to
the "offer of judgment" provision in Federal Rule 68, whereby a party
failing to accept an offer in the form prescribed by the rule, and who
then receives a judgment no more favorable than the terms of the offer,
becomes liable to the offering party for costs incurred after the offer
was rejected. Judge Wald describes this rule as having "obvious potential for promoting settlement," but writes that it has, "for some
reason, never been widely used." 260 In a similar vein I suppose one
could mention that prior to its amendment in 1983 courts seldom invoked Federal Rule 11,2 6 1 the honesty in pleading rule, and accordingly the judicial system never enjoyed the congestion-easing benefits
of its sanctions.
I find this pessimism in part misplaced and in part overstated. Not
every rule of procedure posits efficiency as its primary or even as any
goal. The Project for Effective Justice concluded that rules providing
for discovery were not conducive to settlement. 262 At least with the
hindsight of the past twenty years, we should hardly be surprised that
the federal discovery process has not helped to draw federal lawsuits
to speedier conclusions. Dispatch is simply not discovery's main reason for being. Even among the federal civil rules that do seek to
hasten the pace of litigation, there are mandatory and voluntary varieties, and only the former are reasonably calculated to attain their desired end.
Judge Wald's example, rule 68, is clearly of the voluntary type. As
it is now designed, the success of rule 68 will inevitably depend upon
its acceptance by the "legal culture." Lawyers' lack of acceptance of
rule 68 may, if anything, suggest that it needs to be refined through
more rulemaking. Rule 68 has been under repeated attack of late for
its relatively modest incentives to settle and its failure to offer even
those incentives to defendants. After decades in which the rule was
chronically underused, the Advisory Committee and the Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure belatedly advanced a proposal to
address these deficiencies. 2 6 3
259. Wald, Teaching the Trade: An Appellate Judge's View of Practice·Oriented Legal Edu·
LEGAL Eouc. 35, 37 (1986).

cation, 36 J.
260. Id.

261. 5 c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 63, § 1334 (1969 & Supp. 1987).
262. Rosenberg, supra note 257, at 43.
263. The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure concluded that rule
68 has not provided an effective incentive to encourage settlement, for two reasons. First, unless
the "costs" allowed by the rule are defined to include attorneys' fees, there is insufficient incen-
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Similarly, rule 11, until its amendment effective August 1983, may
well have failed to screen out frivolous pleadings because of its serious
substantive infirmities. As originally written, rule 11 failed to specify
the nature of the lawyer's honest pleading obligation, left the imposition of sanctions to the trial court's discretion, and tended to ensure
that the court's discretion would not be exercised in favor of punishing
a litigant by specifying only the draconian sanction of striking pleadings. 264 Indeed, since rule 11 has been fortified in these respects, the
advance sheets have been peppered with decisions imposing sanctions
under the circumstances prescribed by the amended rule. 265
One distinguished observer concerned with what he calls the
caseload "crisis" in the federal courts overlooks the salutary potential
of rules revision altogether. 266 Judge Posner eschews some of the most
sweeping approaches to the litigation explosion (for example the total
abolition of diversity jurisdiction) but broaches a wide variety of incremental proposals. His immediate "modest and achievable reforms" 267
run a by now familiar gamut which includes assessing attorneys' fees
against litigation losers, raising the minimum amount in controversy
tive for settlement. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of
the United States, Preliminary Draft ofProposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Sept. 1984), reprinted in 102 F.R.D. 407, 432-33 (1985); see Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1,
8-9 (1985). The Supreme Court was able to remedy this deficiency only incrementally in Marek,
by defining the rule 68 "costs" shiftable to a claimant-offeree to include attorneys' fees if the
underlying federal claim-creating statute itself defines attorneys' fees as part of the costs recoverable by a prevailing party. 473 U.S. at 9. As the Advisory Committee noted when it published a
tentative draft proposal to amend rule 68, the instances of such federal statutory definitions are
"rare." 102 F.R.D. at 433-34.
Second, rule 68 cost-shifting, including such attorneys' fees as are shiftable under Marek,
works in favor of defending parties only. See Miller, An Economic Analysis of Rule 68, 15 J.
LEGAL STUD. 93, 121-23 (1986). The Committee proposed that the rule be amended to subject
all offerees, defendants as well as claimants, to appropriate cost sanctions when settlement offers
have been unreasonably rejected. 102 F.R.D. at 433, 435.
The Committee's proposal to amend rule 68 foundered and has now been withdrawn. Congress continues to include attorneys' fees as part of the costs recoverable by a prevailing party
under selected federal substantive statutes. See, e.g., Handicapped Children's Protection Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, § 2(B), 100 Stat. 796, 796. These statutes nick away at the incentive
problem a la Marek but make no headway toward sanctions against defendant-offerees.
264. See FED. R. C1v. P. 11 advisory committee's note on amendment effective August 1,
1983, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198-201 (1983). For these reasons the Committee concluded
that "in practice Rule 11 has not been effective in deterring abuses." Id. at 198.
265. See Oliphant, Rule 11 Sanctions and Standards: Blunting the Judicial Sword, 12 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 731, 739 (1986). The October 1986 newsletter of the Association of American Law Schools Section on Civil Procedure reports the conclusion or' one study that 335 reported decisions on rule 11 sanction motions appeared between August 1983 and March 1986,
compared to only 40 between 1975 and 1983. Newsletter of Assoc. of Am. L. Schools, Oct. 1986,
at 1. See also s. KASSIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS 6, 45 (Federal Judicial
Center 1985) (study finding increased willingness by federal judges to impose rule 11 sanctions in
response to the 1983 amendments).
266. See R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 317-21.
267. Id. at 321.
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for diversity cases, creating new specialized courts, expanding the appellate capacity of federal administrative agencies, repealing limited
classes of federal question jurisdiction, promoting various forms of arbitration, and, most modestly, exhorting the federal judiciary to
rededicate itself to "the principles of judicial self-restraint and institutional responsibility."26s
In his search for a solution, Posner chastises the law schools for
their lack of hospitality to the social scienc~s. Nevertheless, he holds
out more hope for traditional "disinterested doctrinal analysis" than
for "critical legal studies," which he feels offers "little payoff in solving
any of the practical problems of the legal system." 269 At least the
"doctrinal analysts are in a good position to spot some of the growing
deficiencies of federal judicial performance as a result of caseload
pressures. " 270
Given these views, it is puzzling that Judge Posner fails to consider
whether more conscientious monitoring and revision of the Federal
Rules might also contribute to streamlining federal litigation. He is so
attuned to efficiency concerns that his discussion of proposals to curtail federal subject matter jurisdiction dwells as much on "externalities" as on flaws in the traditional justifications for diversity. 271 Yet
his exhaustive canvass of remedies to cure the bloated federal judicial
docket makes no mention of what is theoretically the most direct path
of all - improving the performance of federal rulemakers.
Consider the likely scenario had the Schiavone interpretation of the
second sentence of Federal Rule 15(c) instead been announced by an
amended rule shortly after the interpretive problems attending the
1966 amendment first surfaced in the lower federal courts. Lawyers
probably would not have litigated - today might not dare to, faced
with amended rule 11 - whether the phrase "within the period provided by law for commencing the action against him" includes the
additional time for service allowed by a particular forum state. For
rule 15(c), unlike rules 68 or 11, is not addressed to the mere tactical
or economic calculations of practicing lawyers or the individualized
fairness notions of federal district judges. When the requirements of
rule 15(c) are met relation back is mandatory, 272 and if properly re268. Id. at 319-20.
269. Id. at 331. One is inclined to agree with Judge Posner that, on this subject at least, the
Crits have little to offer. We have not yet realized their vision of a "communitarian" world where
we can afford for rules to be "the subjects of constant negotiation." Menand, Radicalism for
Yuppies, NEW REPUBLIC Mar. 17, 1986, at 20, 23.
270. R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 330.
271. Id. at 176-77.
272. So long as the several requirements of rule 15(c) are satisfied, the party-changing
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drafted the rule could be virtually self-executing on the question of a
notice deadline. One may therefore reasonably anticipate that rules revision of this kind would conserve the resources of litigants and the
federal judicial system.
C.

Who Should Monitor the Rules?

Schiavone illustrates the built-in conflict the Supreme Court faces
when it construes a federal rule of civil procedure. With the sole exception of the 1983 amendments to rule 4, 273 these are rules which the
Court itself once approved and recommended to Congress. One commentator, noting the resulting potential for conflict, has observed that,
consciously or not, the Court has strained to sustain federal rules in
cases challenging their validity. 274 Indeed, challenges to federal rules
have resulted in an unbroken string of decisions sustaining them. 275
Most revealing on this point are the Court's own words in Hanna v.
Plumer. 276 The justices felt obliged to uphold a federal rule because
they could not conclude that "the Advisory Committee, this Court
and Congress erred in their prima facie judgment" that the rule comported with the Rules Enabling Act and any applicable constitutional
constraints.277
At first blush it would seem that the Court in Schiavone approached the interpretation of rule 15(c) rather modestly, without regard to the Court's own role as the rule's promulgator. After all, the
decision is narrow in scope, and it gives the most cramped possible
reading to the notice deadline phrase. Thus the decision is calculated
to render relation back available in very few federal cases. But the
amendment "relates back," and traditionally the matter is not considered to be discretionary
with the trial court.
273. See text at notes 16-21 supra.
274. Lesnick, supra note 6, at 582. See also W. BROWN, FEDERAL RULEMAKING:
PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILmES 75-78 (1981) (terming this lack of "objectivity" the "most frequent and serious argument against the role of the Supreme Court"); Clinton, supra note 142, at
78; J. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 96, 98-99 (1977). Indeed,
the potential for conflict in the Court's roles as promulgator and construer of the Rules was
alluded to by the chairman of the original Advisory Committee even before the rules were enacted. Letter from William D. Mitchell to the Hon. George Wharton Pepper (Dec. 19, 1937),
quoted in Burbank, supra note 26, at 1134 n.530. But cf Clark, supra note 14, at 252-53 (applauding the Supreme Court's decisions that have upheld challenged federal rules as commendable judicial "support" for the concept of uniform national rules of procedure).
275. See, e.g., Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941) (application of rule 35 to plaintiffs); Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946) (rule 4(f)); Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427 (1956) (rule 54(b)); Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Engg. &
Foundry Co., 351U.S.445 (1956) (same); Schlagenhaufv. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964) (application of rule 35 to defendants); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (rule 4(d)(l)).
276. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
277. 380 U.S. at 471.
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Court also concludes that the deadline phrase has a unitary meaning,
rather than one that varies with the different periods prescribed by the
several kinds of available limitations periods "provided by law." Barring a retreat from Schiavone in the form of the Erie or federal question exceptions discussed above, 278 therefore, the net effect of the
decision is to ensure that the Court's narrow construction of rule 15(c)
will have the widest possible application.
Aside from the "inherent dangers in granting rulemaking powers
to the highest appellate court in a judicial system," 279 there are significant practical obstacles to a rules promulgation process dominated by
the Supreme Court. The primary problem is that the justices are simply too busy to propose or draft rules changes. 280 Since the Judicial
Code was amended in 1958 to shift primary responsibility from the
Court to the Judicial Conference, the Supreme Court's review of rules
changes proposed by the Judicial Conference has been relatively perfunctory.281 Professor Friedenthal writes that the Court scrutinized
rules change proposals more carefully before 1956 when it exercised
exclusive control over a standing Advisory Committee. 282 He views
the intense congressional dissatisfaction with the proposed Rules of
Evidence which the Court submitted to Congress in 1972 as a symptom of the Court's declining performance as a rulemaker. 283
The existing process is also attacked on the grounds that the Advisory Committee is unrepresentative of nonelite or nonspecialized constituencies;284 denies meaningful opportunity for public participation,
for example by holding too few public hearings or making major
amendments too late in the process to permit effective response; 285 and
fails to discuss fully the reasons behind its major proposals. 28 6 Similarly, Professor Miller, until recently a reporter to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, speculates that "one of the reasons that
Congress is very much involved in thinking about federal rule making
these days is that there have been accusations that it is a closed process. "287 Professor Friedenthal asserts that the Advisory Committee,
278. See text at notes 230-45 supra.
279. Friedenthal, supra note 19, at 675.
280. See W. BROWN, supra note 274, at 70-73; Clinton, supra note 142, at 78.
281. See, e.g., J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 274, at 99-100; Clintqn, supra note 142, at 77-78.
282. Friedenthal, supra note 19, at 676-77.
283. Id. at 675-76.
284. See W. BROWN, supra note 274, at 64-66; Clinton, supra note 142, at 77; Lesnick, supra
note 6, at 579-80.
285. See W. BROWN, supra note 274, at 51-53; Friedenthal, supra note 19, at 677.
286. See Friedenthal, supra note 19, at 677; W. BROWN, supra note 274, at 53-54.
287. Interview with Arthur Miller, supra note 247, at 8. On the "closed nature of the pro·
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in part because of this isolation, has been "guilty of careless draftsmanship and ... insufficient analysis and ... the Supreme Court [has]
failed to remedy these deficiencies before approving" Rules amendments. 288 Other recent commentary has also questioned the efficacy of
the Rules in reaching their main goals. 289
One might have expected that these trenchant criticisms of the current Court-centered process would have led to calls for a return to
congressional control. After all, Congress' ultimate constitutional authority to declare procedural rules is now substantially unquestioned;
the only remaining issue concerns which, if any, delegee body is best
suited to exercise that authority. 2 9°
For the most part, these calls have not come from even those critics most skeptical that the Supreme Court can dispassionately assess
rules of its own devise. For example, in 1980 Justice Powell, dissenting from the Court's approval of certain amendments to the discovery
rules, observed that "Congress should bear in mind that our approval
of proposed Rules is more a certification that they are the products of
proper procedures than a considered judgment on the merits of the
proposals themselves." 2 9 1 Professor Friedenthal, notwithstanding his
several sharp criticisms of the Supreme Court's rulemaking performance, condemned this dissent as inviting congressional intervention.
He rejoined that it is "far better to leave procedural reform in the
hands of the Supreme Court and its advisory committees, whose members are chosen for their dedication to the improvement of the judicial
process, than to rely on elected politicians who must satisfy many constituents on a variety of issues."292 Disturbed by the unseemly prospect of judges advancing their own desired rules changes through
partisan legislative lobbying, and fearful that pressure from nonjudicial lobbyists will jeopardize proposed reforms, 293 he urged the Court
to reestablish its own firm control rather than permit Congress to fill
the void. 2 9 4
cess," see Clinton, supra note 142, at 77; see also W. BROWN, supra note 274, at 15, 23, 27, 30; J.
WEINSTEIN, supra note 274, at 101.
288. Friedenthal, supra note 19, at 680 (discussing amendments to FED. R. C1v. P. 26(b)(3)
concerning the "work product doctrine" of Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947)).
289. See generally Holland, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: A Policy Evaluation, 3
LAW & POLY. Q. 209 (1981); McKinstry, Civil Discovery Reform, 14 FORUM 790 (1979).
290. See text at notes 8-11 supra; J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 274, at 89-90, 104; W. BROWN,
supra note 274, at 37-39.
291. Order Adopting Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 997,
998 n.1 (Apr. 29, 1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
292. Friedenthal, A Divided Supreme Court Adopts Discovery Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 806, 814-15 (1981).
293. See Friedenthal, supra note 19, at 673.
294. Id. at 685-86.
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This distrust of Congress is prevalent among the Court's critics.
The rulemaking reform proposals they advance thus leave primary
rulemaking authority in the hands of the Supreme Court, or confide it
to the Judicial Conference, or a committee of the Judicial Conference,
or a congressionally appointed independent commission, rather than
the Congress itself.29s
None of these proposals addresses the defect that lies at the heart
of the history of rule 15(c): the lack of a systematic monitoring mechanism to fulfill the charge of 28 U.S.C. § 331 that the Judicial Conference "carry on a continuous study of the operation and effect of the
general rules of practice and procedure." Of course, the very premise
of this statute may be called into question. Professor Rosenberg, for
example, argues that it is the rules themselves which often run counter
to their general goals of promoting just, speedy, and inexpensive litigation outcomes. 296 He terms a "gallant illusion" the assumption that
these goals are "attainable by a monolithic set of rules applied to virtually all the varied types of civil actions filed in the federal district
courts."297 In his view, "more and 'better' rules may not be the an295. Professor Friedenthal urges the Court itself to devote "more diligence" to its review of
the rules. Id. Professor Weinstein views this suggestion as "unrealistic in view of the Court's
heavy workload." J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 274, at 192 n.382.
Professor Weinstein would authorize the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Pro·
cedure of the Judicial conference to perform the main work of identifying, initiating, drafting,
and justifying proposed rules changes. Id. at 110-11. This proposal would serve his main goal of
removing the Supreme Court from the rules promulgation process so that it can judicially review
civil rules independently and impartially. Id. at 149. Professor Weinstein's specification of the
Judicial Conference's Standing Committee rather than the Judicial Conference itself is advertent.
He views the Judicial Conference as "unwieldy and passive" and "heavily dominated by the
Chief Justice." Id. at 110. See also W. BROWN, supra note 274, at 68-69, 78-79 (noting the
centralization of rulemaking power in the Chief Justice). Thus Professor Weinstien would have
the Judicial Conference place its imprimatur on proposals of its Standing Committee so as to
lend them prestige - the role now performed by the Supreme Court vis-a-vis the Judicial Con·
ference. The Judicial Conference's final recommendations would go directly to Congress. J,
WEINSTEIN, supra note 274, at 110-11.
Professor Cramton proposes that a congressional commission initiate new rules, but he would
have that commission report to the Court or the Judicial Conference rather than to Congress. See
W. BROWN, supra note 274, at 84. Professor Clinton, while shifting the "burden of inertia" by
requiring rules change proposals to be submitted as bills "to be enacted through the normal
lawmaking processes," would give Congress no direct role in the initiation or drafting of rules
changes. Clinton, supra note 142, at 80.
Professor Lesnick advocates a "legislative" process through which rules changes would be
drafted by committees of an independent legislative commission with members to be chosen by
judges and members of Congress. The Commission's drafts would then be submitted directly to
Congress, which would engage in "meaningful" review. See Lesnick, supra note 6, at 579-80. In
form, this proposal more than any other has Congress play the central part in the process. Still,
Winifred Brown, author of the Federal Judicial Center's comprehensive survey of the current
rulemaking process, suggests that under Lesnick's system the Commission's proposals "would
presumably receive less detailed review [by Congress] than do rules promulgated under the pres·
ent system." W. BROWN, supra note 274, at 83.
296. Rosenberg, The Federal Civil Rules After Half a Century, 36 ME. L. REV. 243 (1984).
297. Id. at 243.
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swer. Rules require sanctions. Sanctions require enforcement proceedings. These absorb resources of time, energy, and money that it is
the very purpose of the rules to spare. " 298 Advisory committees labor
in vain, he writes, when they "strive constantly to meet criticisms of
the way the rules work by filling their gaps, strengthening their weak
spots, curing their uncertainties and increasing their precision."299
Three justices of the Supreme Court have also worried that proposed
rules amendments often really amount to "tinkering changes" that delay more fundamental reforms. 300
Experience does teach that the process of changing federal rules is
"tortuous and contentious." 301 With this in mind Professor Rosenberg recommends that the Advisory Committee, instead of directing
"its main efforts to improving rules in which particular flaws have appeared," should attempt "a global evaluation and overhaul of the rules
as a totality." 302 However, as informed by the history of rule 15(c), my
own tentative view is that there is much that particularized rules revision can accomplish, that the existing apparatus under the control of
the Court may be able to accomplish it, and that the process suffers
most from the absence of a formal, adequately funded mechanism
within the Judicial Conference for identifying and acting on needed
proposals for Rules reform. Bringing suitable subjects for improvements in the Rules to the attention of the Advisory Committee may be
at least as important as the substance of the Committee's deliberations.

D. Spotting Candidates for Federal Rules Revision
At the root of the wasteful litigation over rule 15(c) is the lack of
an effective institutional watchdog. The federal courts cannot fulfill
that function by themselves. It is ultimately the responsibility of Congress to perform what is, in the end, a legislative function.3°3
The questions raised by some Federal Rules will of necessity be
decided, often without opinion, by federal district judges or magistrates. Discovery disputes are the classic example. They are rarely
resolved by final orders eligible for interlocutory appeal, 304 nor do they
often figure prominently in the review of final judgments. Such ques298. Id. at 244.
299. Id.
300. Order Adopting Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 997,
1000 (Apr. 29, 1980) (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ.).
301. Id.
302. Rosenberg, supra note 296, at 244-45.
303. See text at notes 8 & 290 supra.
304. C. WRIGHT, supra note 195, at 550-51.
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tions will therefore seldom surface in the courts of appeals and in tum
will seldom qualify for certiorari review as issues on which those
courts are in conflict. Even where such squabbles result in published
opinions, an advisory committee would have to scour the advance
sheets assiduously to unearth the decisions that signal the desirability
of reassessing a federal rule.
Some Federal Rules issues do become the subject of competing decisions at the circuit court level. Occasionally - Judge Friendly's
opinion for the Second Circuit in Arrowsmith v. United Press Internationaf 305 is an example - a federal appellate court speaks so articulately or authoritatively that an issue under the Rules which might
have been expected to generate ceaseless controversy becomes, for all
practical purposes, settled. 306 More typically, though, dozens oflower
federal courts plough through the murky waters of Federal Rules litigation, hardly speaking to one another. As the history of rule 15(c)
suggests, at least some of the litigated issues are not worth the costs of
ongoing judicial debate.
Moreover, rules-related cases decided by the courts of appeals may
present issues which fail to impress the Supreme Court with sufficient
national importance to merit review by certiorari. The saga of rule
15(c) again provides an example. Justice White, dissenting in 1985
from the denial of certiorari in Cooper v. United States Postal Service, 307 discussed various interpretations of the rule 15(c) notice deadline announced by six courts of appeals. 308 Although the split of
authority Justice White called to the Court's attention had arisen as
early as 1982, 309 it was not until Schiavone that the Court considered
the issue on the merits. In the meantime many trees gave their lives to
record the struggles of the scores of lawyers and judges who wrestled
with the definition of the rule 15(c) deadline.
305. 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963) (law of the forum state, rather than federal law, governs the
amenability of nonresident defendants in diversity cases, since F. R. C1v. P. 4 prescribes only the
manner, not the reach, of service).
306. The Arrowsmith result has been adopted unanimously by the circuit courts. See cases
cited in J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 163 n.14 (1985).
307. 471 U.S. 1022 (1985).
308. 471 U.S. at 1024.
309. Compare Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 940
(1979) (relation back allowed if misnamed intended defendant served within a "reasonable" time
after limitations period expires), with Hughes v. United States, 701 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1982) (in·
tended defendant, the United States, must separately receive notice of suit within the limitations
period even though originally named defendants, two U.S. government agencies, were timely
served). Indeed, a related conflict had surfaced as early as 1978, between Marshall v. Mulrenin,
508 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1974) (state relation-back rule "substantive" and prevails over federal rela·
tion-back rule), and Britt v. Arvanitis, 590 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1978) (state statute "procedural" and
not controlling in federal diversity action). See text at notes 76-78 supra.
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Even those Federal Rules cases that do come to be heard and decided by the Supreme Court may not settle closely related questions.
Schiavone and Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., which left dangling the
possibility that Federal Rule 3 does define timely commencement in
federal question actions, furnish two vivid illustrations.
Of course the Court itself will sometimes continue to be the first to
glimpse a Federal Rules interpretive problem, as it sifts through petitions or reviews cases on the merits. When it does, the Court should
have a mechanism in place for automatically calling the problem to
the attention of a subcommittee of Congress, the Standing Committee,
or the Advisory Committee. But some rules-related issues will elude
Supreme Court scrutiny, and it is important that those issues, too, be
identified and studied before repetitive litigation yields diminishing returns. If Congress, the Standing Committee, or the Advisory Committee were to monitor Federal Rules litigation systematically, we
would not have to count so heavily on the Supreme Court's certiorari
docket to serve a screening function.
Because the inner workings of the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules have remained hidden from public view, relatively little is
known about the sources of proposals for civil rules reform. At least
in the case of the amendments to the discovery rules effective August
1, 1980, we know that the primary source of the proposal which became the working basis of the recommendations ultimately approved
by the Judicial Conference and the Supreme Court was a study by a
special committee of the American Bar Association. 310 The Committee's current Reporter, Dean Carrington, advises that the process is
quite informal. He writes that "[t]he Committee does receive suggestions from judges, lawyers, Congressmen, members of the Standing
Committee, the Justice Department, the American Bar, local bar
groups, and perhaps other sources." He adds that "these have sometimes been the subject of close study and response, but not always." 311
It is clear that the burden of identifying needed changes and initiating the amendment process now rests with the advisory committees
and, especially, their reporters. 312 The committees do continually receive suggestions from varied sources. 313 Nevertheless, while it was
"the original intention and early practice that reporters engage in con310. See Friedenthal, supra note 292, at 807 (citing LITIGATION SECTION, ABA, REPORT OF
THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF DISCOVERY ABUSE (1977) and id., SECOND REPORT (1980)).
311. Letter from Dean Paul D. Carrington to the author (Nov. 24, 1986) (on file with the
Michigan Law Review).
312. W. BROWN, supra note 274, at 59.
313. Id. at 13, 59 n.139.
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tinuing comprehensive study of the rules and of their operation in both
federal and state courts," and "submit periodic reports on all matters
... such a program of periodic reports based on continuing study has
not proved achievable."3 14
Perhaps the problem is one of resources; the Advisory Committee
membership may not include enough persons with sufficient time to
pore over the importance or merits of each proposal received. 315 One
proposal calls for "hiring a full-time secretariat to engage in constant
oversight and report frequently to the advisory committees." 316
Others recommend the hiring of more reporters and the sponsoring of
institutes to study, analyze, and discuss the desirability of rules
changes. 317 A more modest suggestion is simply to publicize more
widely that "the committees are receptive to comments and suggestions at all times - not only in connection with the proposed
rules." 318
The matter warrants Congress' attention, although obviously that
attention need not lead to its direct intervention in the rules-drafting
process. It may suffice for Congress to beef up the resources at the
Committee's disposal for securing more members or staff by contract
or hire. Additional personnel should certainly improve the Committee's bird-dogging capacity; one happy by-product might be improved
handling of proposals on the merits. The divergence between the
Committee's apparent intentions when it reshaped rule 15(c) in 1966
and its ultimate work product suggests that more time and attention
should be devoted to rules proposals not just at the critical input stage
but throughout the drafting process. A House-passed bill pending
before the current Congress319 does address the representativeness320
and openness321 criticisms of the rules promulgation process and affords Congress at least seven months, instead of three, in which to
exercise its veto of proposed rule changes. 322 Unfortunately, the bill
provides no additional support to the several advisory committees and
314. Id. at 12-13.
315. See id. at 59.
316. Id. at 59.
317. Id. at 60.
318. Id. at 131.
319. H.R. 1507, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
320. H.R. 1507, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1987), proposed new 28 U.S.C. § 2073(a)(2)
(specifying that committees appointed to assist the Judicial Conference shall "consist of a balanced cross section of bench and bar, and trial and appellate judges").
321. H.R. 1507, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1987), proposed new U.S.C. § 2073(c) and (d)
(prescribing, with some exceptions, open meetings and, in addition to official explanatory notes,
written reports explaining committee action, including minority views).
322. H.R. 1507, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1987), proposed new 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a).
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prescribes no measures that would improve their capacity to monitor
litigation. 323
CONCLUSION

The history of rule 15(c), especially after its amendment in 1966,
demonstrates that adjudication has proved a wasteful way to resolve
the ambiguities of that rule. While a few years of common law "conversation" may have been necessary to flesh out the infirmities of the
1966 amendment, the principal interpretive difficulties were fully elaborated in appellate court conflicts long before the Supreme Court finally granted certiorari to resolve a piece of the problem in Schiavone.
Rules which, like 15(c), treat subjects that are amenable to essentially
arbitrary solutions can more efficiently be refined by amendment than
by incremental litigation, with little if any cost to substantial justice.
Further, the complex of institutions charged with continuous
study of the Federal Rules, under the aegis of the Supreme Court, has
not consistently responded in timely fashion to well identified
problems of this character. Specifically, it would appear that obvious
candidates for rules revision either do not reach the Advisory Committee or that the Committee pares its agenda to the bone for lack of
resources or undisclosed reasons of principle.
Congress has recently reentered the civil rulemaking arena on an
ad hoc basis to shape the substance of a proposed Rules amendment.
It could discharge its fundamental rulemaking responsibility more effectively by reassessing the amendment process. It should then redesign or reinvigorate the existing institutional machinery to make it
more responsive to litigation developments that warrant consideration
of Rules amendments.

323. H.R. 1507, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1987), proposed new 28 U.S.C. § 2073(a)(2),
authorizes the Judicial Conference to appoint committees to recommend proposed rule changes
or additions. The section then enjoins the Standing Committee to review, for ultimate recommendation to the Judicial Conference, the recommendations that any committees so appointed
might make. It does not appear that this appointment authorization would alter the existing
rulemaking process, since the Judicial Conference, without formal legislative authority, has long
used the advisory committees in just the way that this section describes. See Procedures for the
Conduct of Business by the Judicial Conference Committees on Rules of Practice and Procedure,
102 F.R.D. 413 (1984).

